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Chapter I: Persuasive advertising alters consumers’ tastes and creates brand loyalty. The 
established view in the economics literature is that such advertising is anti-competitive and results 
in higher prices. This paper demonstrates that this is not necessarily true. This is shown in a 
model of a duopoly with horizontal product differentiation, where firms interact repeatedly over 
an infinite horizon. Firms in such a market try to increase their profits by avoiding price 
competition. They do this by colluding on price while making independent decisions on 
advertising. This practice is called price semicollusion. However, collusion on price leads to 
intensified advertising, which may lower firm profits to below the competitive level when 
advertising is market-stealing (rather than market-expanding). In such a case the collusion on 
price would break down and firms would revert to price competition. Thus, persuasive 
advertising can induce price competition. Moreover, the paper shows that the equilibrium price in 
a market with persuasive advertising can be lower than the price without it. This contradicts the 
prevalent view on the effect of persuasive advertising. 
 
 
 Chapter II: This paper examines the effect of advertising on price collusion using data on price 
fixing across manufacturing industries in the United States. I construct an original dataset from 
summaries of price fixing cases initiated by the Department of Justice between 1960 and 2003. In 
determining if advertising hinders or facilitates price collusion, the paper makes a distinction 
between market-expanding and market-stealing advertising. The need for the distinction between 
the two kinds of advertising is driven by the theoretical model outlined in the paper. The model 
shows that price collusion results in intensified advertising. This could undermine the gains from 
collusion if advertising is market-stealing rather than market-expanding. The paper identifies two 
types of industries where advertising is more market-stealing: (1) Industries with low market 
growth and (2) Industries with high product differentiation. The econometric results from a probit 
model provide evidence that supports the theory. The incidence of collusion is found to be lower 
in low-growth industries with high advertising. Collusion is also found to be less likely in product 
differentiated industries with high advertising.  
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Advertising is an increasingly important means of competition between firms. Ac-
cording to TNS Media Intelligence, total advertising expenditures for all media in the U.S.
in 2004 was $141.1 billion. Whether advertising is used to announce the release of a new
product in the market, to provide information on prices or attributes of existing products
or used as a means to enhance the image of the product in the eyes of the consumer, its
eﬀect seems to be pervasive.
The first chapter of this dissertation deals with advertising that is aimed at en-
hancing the perceived value that a consumer attaches to a product. Such advertising, called
persuasive advertising, is generally believed to be anti-competitive as it tends to make the
demand for an advertised product more inelastic. Thus, it is argued that consumers would
be better oﬀ in the absence of such advertising as they would face lower prices. However, as
is shown in the chapter, advertising can have an important bearing on firms’ pricing conduct
in a market. In particular, when a firm’s advertising has the eﬀect of diverting demand away
2from other firms in the market, in which case advertising is classified as market-stealing,
advertising can break down an attempt at price collusion between firms by reducing the
benefit of price collusion relative to the alternative of price competition. If firms in a mar-
ket were prohibited from engaging in such advertising, successful price collusion would be
possible between them., Thus, under certain conditions the equilibrium price in a market
would be lower, and consumer welfare higher, with persuasive advertising than without.
Chapter 2 examines the incidence of price collusion across U.S. manufacturing
to determine whether advertising facilitates or hinders price collusion. If the theoretical
prediction reached in chapter 2 is accurate, advertising should hinder price collusion when
it is market-stealing and when this eﬀect is significant. On the other hand a facilitating
role for advertising cannot be ruled out, particularly when it serves as a barrier to entry for
new firms.
The study of the incidence of price collusion involves the construction of an original
data set on pricing conduct across the manufacturing sector in the U.S.. This data set is
constructed from summaries of price-fixing cases initiated by the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice between 1960 and 2003. Information from these cases is used to
assign manufacturing industries into one of two groups: collusive and non-collusive. These
two groups of industries are then systematically compared with regards to various industry
characteristics that oligopoly theory suggests aﬀect the likelihood of price collusion including
advertising.
Two empirical strategies are followed to identify industries where advertising might
have a significant market-stealing eﬀect. These are identified as industries that are char-
3acterized by both low market growth and high advertising as part of the first strategy.
The second empirical strategy identifies consumer goods industries with high advertising as
industries with a significant market-stealing advertising.
The results from the estimation of a probit model suggest the following. The in-
cidence of price collusion is lower amongst industries that are characterized by low growth
and high advertising. The incidence of collusion is also found to be lower amongst consumer
goods industries with high advertising. Taken together, these results imply that the inci-
dence of price collusion is lower in industries characterized by a significant market-stealing
eﬀect of advertising. This lends support to the main hypothesis that advertising can break
down price collusion when it is market-stealing.
The estimation results also provide evidence that higher market growth and higher
capital intensity are both associated with a higher likelihood of collusion. This eﬀect of these
industry characteristics on the incidence of collusion have been documented before using
U.K. data from the 1950s and that on export cartel formation in the U.S. in the 1920s and
1930s.
4Chapter 2
Persuasive Advertising and Price
Semicollusion
2.1 Introduction
Advertising that directly aﬀects a consumer’s preferences to increase the con-
sumer’s valuation of the advertised product is called persuasive advertising. Such advertis-
ing makes demand more inelastic. The result of such advertising, according to the existing
literature, is a softening of price competition between oligopolistic firms resulting in higher
prices in equilibrium. Persuasive advertising is thus viewed as being anti-competitive.
This paper presents a theoretical model that incorporates all the essential features
of persuasive advertising. However, contrary to the existing view, the paper shows that
persuasive advertising is not necessarily anti-competitive. It can weaken the incentives for
tacit price collusion and thus help in fostering competition. Furthermore, consumers may
5face a lower price with such advertising than without. This is shown in a dynamic game
with repeated interaction between oligopolistic firms who choose price and advertising every
period.
2.2 Literature Review
According to Tirole (1988), persuasive advertising is viewed as altering consumers’
tastes, creating product diﬀerentiation that is not real (“spurious” product diﬀerentiation)
and brand loyalty. Such advertising is believed, at best, to persuade consumers and at
worst, to fool them ( Galbraith (1967), Solow (1967)). As a consequence of advertising, the
demand for an advertised product becomes more inelastic, resulting in higher prices. It is
also thought that such advertising by established firms may give rise to barriers to entry.
If advertising has an eﬀect of inducing brand loyalty amongst consumers and tying them
in, established firms can gain a captive set of consumers with the help of advertising over
a sustained period of time. A potential entrant needs to contend with the required level
of advertising expenditure go wean consumers away from the established firms in addition
to any other investments. Thus the established view on persuasive advertising suggests it
may have strong anti-competitive eﬀects as it has no “real” value to consumers. Bagwell
(2003) states that Joan Robinson was amongst the first advocates of this view. According
to Robinson (1933), “the customer will be influenced by advertisements , which play upon
his mind with studied skill and makes him prefer the goods of one producer over another
because they are brought to his notice in a more pleasing and forceful manner.” On the other
hand, Braithwate (1928) regarded advertising as a “selling cost”. As per him, firms engage
6in advertising in order to change consumers’ valuations so that they value the advertised
product more. Advertising thus, shifts out a consumer’s demand for the advertised product
thereby distorting the consumers decisions compared to those that are represented by his
“true” preferences (captured by the pre-advertising demand). The economic resources that
are used in advertising activities thus may be wasted, since advertising’s eﬀect is to induce
consumers to buy the “wrong” quantities of goods that are not well suited to their true
needs at prices that are swollen from the cost of advertising.
Advertising for consumer goods (usually non-durable) for which consumers are not
likely to indulge in costly search before purchase, is believed by many to be of the persuasive
type. Network television is usually the medium of such advertising. The medium has a very
wide reach but often conveys very little information. Nicholls’ (1951) study of the cigarette
industry shows that from the 1920s on, cigarette manufacturers primarily competed through
advertising and brand proliferation instead of competing on price or quality.
Dixit and Norman (1978) show that persuasive advertising in an oligopolistic in-
dustry softens price competition between firms resulting in higher prices in equilibrium. As
a result, consumer welfare is lower with advertising than without. This is in contrast with
the case where advertising is informative, where consumer welfare is higher with advertising
than without (Stigler and Becker (1977)).
As I show, the equilibrium price in an oligopolistic industry can be lower with
persuasive advertising than without. Welfare comparisons should take this possibility into
account.
72.3 The Model
The theoretical model draws from Singh and Vives (1984) and has an oligopolistic
industry with two firms, each one producing a horizontally diﬀerentiated good, and a com-
petitive numeraire good producing industry. There is a continuum of identical consumers,
each with a utility function separable and linear in the numeraire good, thus eliminating any
income eﬀects on the goods produced in the oligopolistic industry. The mass of consumers
is normalized to one without loss of generality.
The setup of Singh and Vives is modified to incorporate persuasive advertising. I
model persuasive advertising by firms as aﬀecting the preferences of the consumers in two
possible ways. First, it may enhance the value of the advertised product in the eye of the
consumer. I shall term this type of advertising Type A advertising. Type A advertising
in turn may work in two ways. It may be generic, in the sense that advertising by firm 1
not only increases the value attached by the consumer to the product of firm 1 but also
the value attached to the product of firm 2. This is especially likely if the two products are
seemingly identical and satisfy similar wants. On the other hand, type one advertising may
be purely selective. This is the case when advertising by firm 1 only increases the value
attached by the consumer to the product of firm 1.
Second, advertising by a firm may seek to align the preferences of the consumer
more in line with the characteristics of the advertised product. I call this Type B advertising.
Such advertising would increase the value of the advertised product as well as lower the value
of the other product. Type B advertising is thus like a tug of war.1.
1This is consistent with how the literature on advertising views persuasive advertising aﬀecting consumers’
preferences. For instance see von der Fehr and Stevik (1998).
8I denote the prices charged by firm 1 and firm 2 as p1 and p2 respectively and Φ1
and Φ2 as the respective levels of advertising undertaken by them. The quantities of the two
products consumed by the representative consumer are denoted by q1 and q2 respectively.
Since the utility function is separable and linear in the numeraire good, the consumer’s
problem can be expressed as the maximization of the (sub) utility function corresponding
to the oligopolistic industry. The consumer selects a pair (q1, q2) to solve:
max u (q1, q2)−
2X
i=1
piqi
where
u (q1, q2) =
2X
i=1
[σ + (ε+ τ)Φi − (ψ − τ)Φj 6=i] qi −
1
2
¡
ωq21 + 2χq1q2 + ωq
2
2
¢
The goods are substitutes, independent or complementary depending on whether
χ > 0, χ = 0 or χ < 0. I shall restrict attention to the case where the goods produced by
the two firms are imperfect substitutes (thus it is assumed that ω > χ).
The eﬀect of advertising on the consumer’s utility is captured by the parameters
ε, τ and ψ. The eﬀect of the selective component of Type A advertising is captured by ε,
whereas that of the generic component is captured by τ . The eﬀect of Type B advertising
is captured by ψ.
The above utility function gives rise to the following demand functions for firm 1
and firm 2 respectively2
D1 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α− βp1 + δp2 + γΦ1 − λΦ2 (2.1)
2The derivation of the demand functions is shown in the appendix. The parameters β and δ are respec-
tively the own-price eﬀect and the cross-price eﬀect where β = ωω2−χ2 and δ =
χ
ω2−χ2 .
9and
D2 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α− βp2 + δp1 + γΦ2 − λΦ1 (2.2)
where the parameters γ and λ capture the eﬀects of advertising and are defined
as follows.
Definition 1 Define γ as the own-eﬀect of advertising such that γ = ε+τω+χ .
Definition 2 Define λ as the magnitude of cross-eﬀect of advertising such that λ = | τ−ψω+χ |3.
The demand functions above are for the case where the eﬀect of Type B advertising
dominates the generic eﬀect of Type A advertising. Advertising by a firm reduces the
demand of the other firm in the industry. In such a case, advertising in the industry is said
to be market-stealing. If the generic component of Type A advertising were to dominate
instead, advertising in the industry would be market-expanding. Advertising by a firm
would then increase the demand for the other firm in the industry as well. This would be
represented by λ entering the demand functions with a positive sign as follows
D1 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α− βp1 + δp2 + γΦ1 − λΦ2 (2.3)
and
D2 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α− βp2 + δp1 + γΦ2 − λΦ1 (2.4)
Note that the elasticity of demand for, say, firm 1 at p1 = p2 = p and Φ1 = Φ2 = Φ
is
1 = −
∂D1
∂p1
p1
D1
=
(β − δ) p
α− (β − δ) p+ (γ − λ)Φ
3Thus, λ = ψ−τω+χ if ψ > τ and λ =
τ−ψ
ω+χ if ψ > τ .
10
At any positive level of demand, the elasticity of demand is a decreasing function
of advertising. This is consistent with the view on persuasive advertising.
Firms have access to the same advertising and production technologies. The cost
of advertising is aΦ
2
2 . The marginal cost of production is constant and is set equal to zero.
There are infinite periods over which firms face each other in the market. In each
period the demand facing each firm is as given in eq.(2.1) and eq. (2.2). In each of these
periods, firms choose their respective prices and advertising levels.
2.3.1 Competition
Under competition, firms compete on both price and advertising. The equilibrium
of the repeated game is for each firm to choose the Nash equilibrium price and advertising
of the one-shot simultaneous move stage game. In this case firm 1’s behavior is described
by
max
½
π1 = p1 (α− βp1 + δp2 + γΦ1 − λΦ2)− a
Φ21
2
¾
with respect to {p1,Φ1}
and firm 2 ’s behavior is similarly described. The first order conditions4 give the
two best response functions for firm 1
p1 =
1
2β
[α+ δp2] +
1
2β
[γΦ1 − λΦ2] (2.5)
and
Φ1 =
γ
a
p1 (2.6)
4The strict concavity of the demand functions in guarantee the staisfaction of the second order conditions.
11
The first term on the right-hand side of eq.(2.5) is simply the price best response
function without advertising where firm 1’s optimal price is increasing in the price charged
by firm 2. The second term is an extra markup associated with the presence of advertising
and reflects the fact that the elasticity of demand is lower with advertising.
Eq.(2.6) states that the optimal level of advertising for a firm is such that at that
level, the marginal cost of an additional unit of advertising is exactly oﬀset by the marginal
benefit from advertising (which is equal to the profit margin times the increase in demand
brought about by that extra unit of advertising).5
Solving for the Nash equilibrium (pn1 = p
n
2 = p
n and Φn1 = Φ
n
2 = Φ
n) I get
pn =
1
(2β − δ) [α+ (γ − λ)Φ
n]
pn =
aα
a (2β − δ)− γ (γ − λ) (2.7)
Φn =
αγ
a (2β − δ)− γ (γ − λ) (2.8)
The equilibrium price pn in eq.2.7 exceeds the Nash equilibrium price without
advertising α(2β−δ) This is due to the lower elasticity of demand in the presence of advertising
. Advertising may give each firm a set of captive or loyal customers. The firms would not
compete as intensively for these customers. Advertising thus, lowers the intensity of price
competition, thereby increasing the equilibrium price.
Interestingly, the equilibrium price is decreasing in the cost of advertising (a). The
reason for this is that advertising lowers the price elasticity of demand, thereby increasing
the price that a firm can charge. Higher advertising cost, by lowering the equilibrium level of
5Note that firm 2’s advertising level Φ2 does not directly enter firm1’s advertising best response function.
However, firm 1’s optimal choice of advertising does depend on firm 2’s advertising through the latter’s
influence on firm1’s optimal price (as shown in firm1’s price best response function in eq.2.5) which does
enter its advertising best response function.
12
advertising, lowers the equilibrium price as well. As the cost of advertising rises, firms rely
less on advertising as a means of competition and are forced to compete more intensively
on price, thus driving down the price charged in equilibrium. Consider the case where the
cost of advertising is such that it makes advertising prohibitive such that firms choose not
to advertise at all in equilibrium (when α→∞). In such a case the equilibrium price would
be given by pn = α(2β−δ) . This is equal to the equilibrium price without advertising and
lower than the equilibrium price with positive advertising in this model.
Under competition, each firm sets its price equal to pn and advertising equal to
Φn in each period. The profit earned by each firm in every period is denoted by πn.
2.3.2 Semicollusion
Firms can try to collectively reign in price competition while setting advertising
levels independently in an eﬀort to raise their profits. This practice where firms collude on
price but compete on advertising is called price semicollusion. Many authors such as Scherer
(1980), Brander (1984) and Davidson and Deneckere (1990) have argued that frequently,
firms in oligopolistic markets have tended to compete with respect to non-price variables
such as advertising, capacity or R&D and collude on price. Symeonidis (2003) surveys
price-fixing agreements in the 1950s in the United Kingdom and finds the such agreements
did not include agreements or restrictions on such activities as advertising and R&D6.
6Firms may realize that aggressive price competition of the type described above is extremely detrimental
to all firms, where the adverse impact on all the firms of this form of competition is immediate. Firms may
then tacitly and collectively reign themselves in from engaging in this form of competition while competing
with each other through other non-price means of competition like advertising. This is especially true if the
means of non-price-competition like advertising is perceived to produce gains for the firm that are not easily
replicated by its rivals. Another reason behind such a practice is that cooperation on price or quantity may
be more feasible than cooperation on other variables (advertising or R&D) because the former are more
easily observed and may be easier to adjust.
13
A classic example, as cited by Nicholls (1952) and Scherer (1980) is of the cigarette
industry in the 1920s and 1930s. The Big Three (American, Ligget & Myers and Reynolds)
controlled between 70% and 90% of the market during this period and there is evidence that
they colluded on price. However they competed intensively on advertising. More recently,
Slade (2000) and Ramrattan (1999) find empirical evidence in support of firms colluding
on price and competing on advertising in the market for saltine crackers and automobiles
respectively. Nevo (1998) provides evidence that refutes the results of earlier empirical work
by Schmalensee (1978) and Scherer (1982) that had found evidence of firms colluding on
price and competing through advertising in the ready-to-eat cereal industry.
Even though previous research has studied semicollusion, it has done so with re-
gard to cartels colluding on price or quantity and competing through investment in capacity
or through R&D. To the best of my knowledge, the case of firms colluding on price and
competing on advertising has not been studied at a theoretical level before. Since adver-
tising has very diﬀerent eﬀects and implications than other means of non-price competition
like R&D7, the case of price semicollusion and advertising competition warrants a separate
analysis in itself. Equally important, studying price semicollusion helps in analyzing im-
portant implications of persuasive advertising in an industry that have not been considered
previously.
The following analysis of price semicollusion and advertising competition shows
that what determines whether semicollusion results in higher or lower profits than compe-
tition are the eﬀects of advertising. In particular, only when advertising in an industry is
7In the literature, R&D has been modeled in a way that investment in it leads to lower production costs.
R&D thus operates on the production side. Advertising on the other hand enters the demand side.
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market-stealing can firm profits be lower under semicollusion than under competition.
Price semicollusion is analyzed as follows. First, I characterize firm behavior under
price semicollusion. This identifies the price and advertising level chosen by the firms in
each period. Next, I identify the conditions under which such behavior on the part of firms
is subgame-perfect. This involves comparing the benefits from semicollusion to the firms’
incentive of deviating from it.
Firm Price and Advertising under Semicollusion
Under price semicollusion, in each period the two firms set their prices to maximize
the sum of their individual profits with the knowledge that each firm will be independently
determined by each firm to maximize its individual profit. Thus, p1 and p2 will be deter-
mined by the maximization of the joint profits over them for given advertising levels of the
two firms as follows
max



π1 + π2 = p1 [α− βp1 + δp2 + γΦ1 − λΦ2]− aΦ
2
1
2
+p2 [α− βp2 + δp1 + γΦ2 − λΦ1]− aΦ
2
2
2



with respect to p1 and p2. The first order condition for firm 1’s price for a given level of
advertising undertaken by it is given by (the superscript pc denotes price collusion)
ppc =
1
2 (β − δ) [α+ (γ − λ)Φ] (2.9)
The advertising level of firm i, on the other hand, will be determined by the
maximization of πi alone over Φi for given prices of firm 1 and firm 2. For firm 1 the
problem is represented as
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max
½
π1 = p1 [α− βp1 + δp2 + γΦ1 − λΦ2]− a
Φ21
2
¾
with respect to Φ1.Firm 2’s behavior would be similarly described. The first order
condition for firm 1’s advertising level for a given price level chosen by firm 1 is still given
by eq.(2.6) above.
Solving the two first order conditions given by eq.(2.9) and eq.(2.6) yield the
following symmetric solution
ppc =
aα
2a (β − δ)− γ (γ − λ) (2.10)
Φpc =
αγ
2a (β − δ)− γ (γ − λ) (2.11)
Proposition 1 The price under price semicollusion, exceeds the price that prevails under
competition.
Proof. See appendix.
When firms set prices collusively, the incentive to undercut the rival’s price is
eliminated and the collusive price is therefore, higher than the Nash equilibrium price.
Proposition 2 The level of advertising that prevails under price semicollusion exceeds the
level of advertising under competition.
Proof. Given that β > δ, (2β − δ) > 2 (β − δ).Comparing the Nash equilibrium
advertising level Φn in eq.(2.8) with the equilibrium advertising level Φpc in eq.(2.11) one
can see that the latter exceeds the former .
Since the level of advertising is set competitively even when firms collude on price,
the optimal level of advertising for each firm is still given by the advertising best response
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function in eq.(2.6). This is increasing in the price charged by the firm since the marginal
benefit of an additional unit of advertising is higher when the profit margin is higher. Since
the price under semicollusion is higher (from proposition 2) so is the level of advertising.
This result is independent of whether advertising is market-stealing or market-expanding.
Price Semicollusion as Subgame-Perfect Outcome
Under price semicollusion, each firm would set its price equal to ppc and advertising
equal to Φpc in each period. The profit earned by each firm in every period is denoted by πpc.
Assuming that firms support semicollusion through Nash reversion grim-trigger strategies89,
firms would have an incentive to engage in price semicollusion only if the profits of each firm
are higher than those under competition10. The grim-trigger strategies would constitute a
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the repeated game (with price semicollusion as the subgame-
perfect outcome) if the loss of future gains from semicollusion exceed the one-time benefit
of deviating.
Let πpcd denote a firm’s profit from optimally deviating in any period when the
other firm chooses the semicollusion price and advertising. Furthermore, let d denote each
firm’s discount factor. For price semicollusion to be a subgame-perfect outcome of the
repeated game the following condition needs to be satisfied
8The grim-trigger strategy for firm i is given as:
(1) At t=1 choose semicollusion price and advertising level.
(2) At any t >1, choose semicollusion price and advertising level if both firms had chosen these in all
previous periods; otherwise revert forever to the Nash equilibrium price and advertising level.
9The use of these punishments is common in the literature. It is argued that features of antitrust laws
imply that this is the correct benchmark to punishment to use as a response to a breakdown of collusion.
For e.g. see Deneckere (1982), Chang (1991) and Ross (1992).
10Given that collusion is illegal and carries the risk of prosecution, firms would enage in such collusion if
it yeilds benefit in terms of higher profits than the alternative— competition.
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πpc
1− d ≥ π
pc
d + π
n d
1− d (2.12)
For the above to be true, a necessary condition is for the semicollusion profit to
exceed the competitive profit
πpc ≥ πn (2.13)
The following two sections show that the distinction between market-expanding
and market-stealing advertising is critical in determining whether the above necessary condi-
tion is satisfied. While the condition is always satisfied when advertising is market-stealing,
it is not always satisfied when advertising is market-stealing. Thus, as is shown below, price
semicollusion is not always subgame-perfect when advertising is market-stealing.
Price Semicollusion with Market-Expanding Advertising
When advertising is market-expanding one firm’s advertising increases the other
firm’s demand. The demand functions of the two firms in such a case are
D1 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α− βp1 + δp2 + γΦ1 + λΦ2
and
D2 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α− βp2 + δp1 + γΦ2 + λΦ1
For given values of the parameters a, α, β and δ, the diﬀerence between the profit of
each firm under price semicollusion and that under competition (πpc−πn) can be expressed
as a function of γ and λ. I denote this function by G (γ, λ) 11.
11This function is defined over the range of parameter values over which both πpc and πn are positive.The
consition 2aδ − γ (γ + λ) ≥ 0 guarantees that both πpc and πn are positive.
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Definition 3 G (γ, λ) = πpc (γ, λ)− πn (γ, λ).
Lemma 1 G (γ, λ) > 0.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 3 Price semicollusion is subgame-perfect when advertising is market-expanding
if firms value the future suﬃciently.
Proof. From lemma 1 and condition given by eq.(2.12).
When advertising is market-expanding, a firm benefits from the advertising of
another firm in the industry. Under price semicollusion, firms benefit both from the higher
price that results directly from the collusion and the higher advertising by each firm that
follows because of the higher price. Thus, the profits of firms under price semicollusion are
always higher than those under competition12. This is independent of the magnitude of
market-expanding eﬀect of advertising. Thus, price semicollusion can be subgame-perfect
if the discount factor d satisfies the condition given by eq. (2.12).
This result is in contrast to that of Brod and Shivkumar, who study the case
of price semicollusion and R&D competition. As stated before, they find that the R&D
investment of one firm should have “significant” positive spillovers on the other’s profits for
price semicollusion to generate higher profits than competition.
12This result extends to the case where λ = 0, i.e. when advertising has no cross eﬀect.
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Price Semicollusion with Market-Stealing Advertising
When advertising is market-stealing, a firm’s advertising adversely aﬀects the
other’s demand and profit. The firms’ demand functions are given by
D1 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α− βp1 + δp2 + γΦ1 − λΦ2
and
D2 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α− βp2 + δp1 + γΦ2 − λΦ1
Again, for given values of the parameters a, α, β and δ, the diﬀerence between the
profit of each firm under price semicollusion and that under competition (πpc − πn) can be
expressed as a function of γ and λ. I denote this function by F (γ, λ)13.
Definition 4 F (γ, λ) = πpc (γ, λ)− πn (γ, λ).
As shown above, a necessary condition for price semicollusion to be subgame-
perfect is for semicollusion profits (πpc) to exceed the competitive profits (πn). In other
words, price semicollusion cannot be subgame-perfect if F (γ, λ) < 0.
When F (γ, λ) = 0, profits under price semicollusion are equal to those under
competition. Using the implicit function theorem, F (γ, λ) = 0 defines the implicit function
λ = f (γ). For a given value of γ, f (γ) gives the critical value of λ such that the profit of
each firm is equal under price semicollusion and competition.
Lemma 2 The function λ = f (γ) has a negative slope, i.e. dλdγ < 0.
13This function is defined over the range of parameter values over which both πpc and πn are positive.The
consition 2aδ − γ2 > 0 guarantees that both πpc and πn are positive.
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Proof. See appendix.
In figure 1 I plot the implicit function λ = f (γ) defined by F (γ, λ) = 0. It
represents those values of γ and λ such that each firm’s profit is equal under semicollusion
and competition. The negative slope of the function implies that the critical value of λ,
such that πpc = πn, is decreasing in γ.
Definition 5 The market-stealing eﬀect of advertising is said to be dominant if λ > f (γ).
The f (γ) curve thus partitions the parameter space into two regions. In the region
above the curve, the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising is dominant.
Lemma 3 Firm profits are lower under price semicollusion than under competition when
the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising is dominant.
Proof. See appendix.
For a given value of γ, f (γ) gives the critical value of λ such that F (γ, λ) = 0.
As stated in lemma 2 above, for values of λ higher than this critical value, F (γ, λ) < 0 i.e.
the profit of each firm under price semicollusion is lower than that under competition.
On the other hand, for values of λ lower than this critical value, F (γ, λ) > 0
i.e. the profit of each firm under price semicollusion is higher than that under competition.
Thus, for a given value of γ, f (γ), gives the threshold value of λ, such that only for values of
λ below this threshold level will price semicollusion be “profitable”. For values of λ higher
than this threshold level, firms will not find semicollusion “profitable”. This allows us to
state the following proposition the proof of which follows from lemma 3 and the necessary
condition given by eq.(2.13).
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Proposition 4 Firms will not engage in price semicollusion when the market-stealing eﬀect
of advertising is dominant.
Proof. Follows from lemma 3 and necessary condition for price semicollusion to
be subgame-perfect given in eq. (2.13).
When advertising is market-stealing, price semicollusion aﬀects firms in two dif-
ferent ways. On the one hand, firms benefit from the higher price that is the direct result of
the price collusion (proposition 1). However, firms advertise more as a result of the higher
price under semicollusion (proposition2 ). Since advertising is market-stealing, higher ad-
vertising by both firms under semicollusion adversely eﬀects firm profits much more than
under competition. When the market-stealing eﬀect is large, this eﬀect of higher advertising
is strong enough to negate all the gains of price collusion. In such a case each firm’s profit
is lower under semicollusion than under competition. Price semicollusion is not consistent
with subgame-perfect behavior.
Note that for semicollusion to be “profitable”, the higher is the own-eﬀect of
advertising (γ) lower should be the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising (λ). keeping the
own-eﬀect of advertising fixed, a high value of the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising serves
to reduce the benefits from price collusion due to the reasons stated above. Furthermore,
keeping the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising fixed, a high value of the own-eﬀect of
advertising also reduces the benefits of price collusion. The own-eﬀect captures the private
benefit from advertising that accrues to a firm from its advertising. The higher this is the
more each firm will advertise. But, the greater the level of advertising undertaken by each
firm the greater is the “damage” inflicted by each firm on the other for any given level
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of the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising. Thus, in general, very high values of either
eﬀect of advertising would be inconsistent with semicollusion being subgame-perfect when
advertising is market-stealing.
When the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising is not dominant, intensified adver-
tising competition does not negate all the gains from price collusion. Firm profits under
price semicollusion are higher than under competition. Thus, price semicollusion can be
subgame-perfect if the discount factor d satisfies the condition given by eq. (2.12).
When the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising is dominant, firms gain nothing
from price semicollusion and any attempt at it would break down with firms reverting to
competition. This is independent of the magnitude of the discount factor of each firm.
In such a case, if firms were prevented from advertising they could collude on price since
their profits in each period would unambiguously be higher. In such a case advertising
would not be present as a choice variable to “restrict” the firms’ ability to collude on price.
The relevant equilibrium price to consider in the absence of advertising would then be the
collusive price (given a high enough discount factor).
2.3.3 Advertising Cost and Product Substitutability
Previous research on semicollusion studies cartel formation when firms jointly de-
termine output but make independent decisions on R&D expenditure or investment capac-
ity. Fershtman and Gandal (1994) find that what determines whether semicollusion leads
to higher or lower profits for the firms constituting the cartel, is the cost of R&D (capacity).
If the cost of investing in R&D (installing capacity) is suﬃciently high, semicollusion would
generate higher profits for the firms than competition. If not then semicollusion would lead
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to lower profits for the firms constituting the cartel than if they were to compete on both
price and R&D (capacity). Brod and Shivkumar (1999), build on Fershtman and Gandal’s
analysis, to allow for the possibility of positive spillovers in R&D and the possibility of the
firms’ products being imperfect substitutes. They find that, for a given cost of R&D, the de-
terminants of whether semicollusion leads to higher profits than competition, are the degree
of substitutability between the products of the firms and the extent of positive spillovers
between the R&D of one firm and the profit of another. In their analysis, semicollusion
leads to higher profits than competition, if the positive spillovers are suﬃciently high and
/or the degree of substitutability is suﬃciently low.
In the analysis in the preceding two sections the focus has been on the nature of
advertising and how this aﬀects the gains from semicollusion to firms. I show that when
advertising is market-expanding, i.e. when advertising by one firm exerts a positive exter-
nality on the other firm, price semicollusion always leads to higher profits for firms than
competition, irrespective of the magnitude of this positive externality. In fact, unless ad-
vertising by a firm exerts a negative externality on the other firm, i.e. unless advertising
is market-stealing, price semicollusion can not lead to lower profits than competition. Fur-
thermore, even in the latter case, semicollusion may yet generate higher profits for firms
than competition.
In this section I analyze the relationship between advertising cost and the gains
from semicollusion vis a vis competition when advertising is market-stealing. Next, I look at
the relationship between the degree of substitutability between products and the gains from
collusion. The magnitude of the cross-price eﬀect captures the degree of substitutability
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between products, with a higher cross-price eﬀect being associated with a greater degree of
substitutability between products14.
As shown before, for given values of all parameters in the model, including the
cost of advertising (a) and the cross-price eﬀect (δ), the gains from price collusion are
negated by intensified advertising competition when the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising
is dominant. This is the case when λ > f (γ) and price semicollusion is not subgame-perfect.
For λ < f (γ), semicollusion gives each firm a higher profit every period than competition.
The function λ = f (γ), divides the advertising parameter space into two regions. For
combinations of the advertising parameters λ and γ that lie in the region above the function,
semicollusion is not subgame-perfect whereas in the region below the curve semicollusion
can be subgame-perfect. Any change that increases the latter region, i.e. increases the
subset of advertising parameter space for which semicollusion can be subgame-perfect is
akin to one that makes semicollusion easier to sustain.
The eﬀect of the advertising cost parameter (a) and the cross price eﬀect (δ) on
the relation between firm profits under price semicollusion and those under competition,
can be assessed by their impact on the function λ = f (γ).
Lemma 4 If λ = f1 (γ) gives the locus of values of γ and λ such that πpc = πn when
a = a1 and λ = f2 (γ) denotes the same when a = a2 such that a2 > a1 then f2 (γ) lies
above f1 (γ) everywhere.
Proof. See appendix.
14Recall that χ captures the degree of product substitutability in the utility function. The cross price
eﬀect is captured by δ which equals χω2−χ2 which is increasing in χ.
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Lemma 5 If λ = f1 (γ) gives the locus of values of γ and λ such that πpc = πn when
a = a1 and λ = f2 (γ) denotes the same when a = a2 such that a2 < a1 then f2 (γ) lies
below f1 (γ) everywhere.
Proof. Analogous to proof of Lemma 4.
Thus, a higher value of the advertising cost parameter (a) implies that for a given
value of the own-eﬀect of advertising (γ), the market-stealing eﬀect (λ) needs to be higher
for intensified advertising competition to exactly oﬀset the gains from price collusion. This
means that a higher advertising cost implies a larger subset of the advertising parameter
space for which semicollusion can be subgame-perfect. Lemmas 4 and 5 now allow us to
state the following proposition.
Proposition 5 The higher is the advertising cost, the easier it is to sustain price semicol-
lusion when advertising is market-stealing.
Proof. Follows from lemmas 4 and 5.
A higher value of the advertising cost parameter (a) leads to a lower level of
advertising by firms under competition as well as under semicollusion. The lower level of
advertising under semicollusion means that it may not be enough to outweigh the gains of
price collusion even for relatively high values of the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising.
In eﬀect, higher advertising cost makes semicollusion more attractive to firms by reducing
the intensity of advertising competition that takes place under it thereby not allowing the
market-stealing eﬀect of advertising to come in play as much as it would if the advertising
competition were more intense with lower advertising cost.
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A higher degree of product substitutability increases the attractiveness of price
semicollusion. The gains from reigning in price competition relative to setting prices ag-
gressively and independently are far higher when the goods are close substitutes of each
other than when the goods are relatively independent. High gains from price collusion
mean that these may not be completely negated by intensified advertising competition even
when the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising is relatively strong. Thus, a greater degree
of substitutability between the firms’ products allows price semicollusion to be subgame-
perfect over a larger range of values of the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising and thus
over a larger subset of the advertising parameter space. This is stated in Proposition 6 that
follows from Lemmas 6 and 7.
Lemma 6 If λ = f1 (γ) gives the locus of values of γ and λ such that πpc = πn when δ = δ1
and λ = f2 (γ) denotes the same when δ = δ2 such that δ2 > δ1 then f2 (γ) lies above f1 (γ)
everywhere.
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 7 If λ = f1 (γ) gives the locus of values of γ and λ such that πpc = πn when δ = δ1
and λ = f2 (γ) denotes the same when δ = δ2 such that δ2 < δ1 then f2 (γ) lies below f1 (γ)
everywhere.
Proof. Analogous to proof of lemma 6
Thus, a greater degree of product substitutability as captured by the cross-price
eﬀect (δ) implies that for a given value of the own-eﬀect of advertising (γ), the market-
stealing eﬀect (λ) needs to be higher for intensified advertising competition to exactly oﬀset
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the gains from price collusion. This means that a greater degree of product substitutability
implies a larger subset of the advertising parameter space for which semicollusion can be
subgame-perfect. Lemmas 6 and 7 now allow us to state the following proposition.
Proposition 6 The higher is the degree of product substitutability, the easier it is to sustain
price semicollusion when advertising is market-stealing.
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 6 and 7.
Figure 2.5 shows the λ = f2 (γ) curve corresponding to a = a2 (δ2) above the
λ = f1 (γ) curve corresponding to a = a1 (δ1) where a2 > a1 (δ2 > δ1). Both, higher
advertising cost and a greater degree of product substitutability make semicollusion more
attractive relative to competition for firms.
2.4 Price Comparison Across Regimes
Benham (1972), Cady (1976), Maurizi and Kelly (1978), Feldman and Begun
(1978, 1980) and Kwoka (1984) all find empirical evidence that regulatory restriction on
advertising is associated with higher prices when advertising is informative. In this sec-
tion I show that restrictions on advertising can be associated with higher prices even when
advertising is persuasive, albeit due to completely diﬀerent reasons. This goes against the
established view in the literature on advertising.
In section 2.3.2 I showed that when advertising is market-stealing, competition in
advertising may prevent firms from benefitting from price semicollusion such that the profit
of each firm is lower under price semicollusion than under competition (πpc < πn). In such
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a case price semicollusion can not constitute a subgame-perfect outcome of a repeated game
between firms.
What determines whether firms find it mutually beneficial to engage in price semi-
collusion are the magnitudes of the two eﬀects of advertising: the magnitude of the own
eﬀect (γ) and the magnitude of the cross eﬀect (λ) when advertising is market-stealing.
For a given value of γ, the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising is said to be dominant
when λ > f (γ). Thus, the presence of advertising as a means of non-price competition
prevents firms from engaging in price semicollusion when advertising is market-stealing and
this eﬀect is dominant.
This eﬀect of advertising should be taken into consideration in assessing the impact
of any regulation on advertising such as an outright ban. Consumers may face a higher price
without advertising than in the presence of advertising. This is because under the conditions
of advertising outlined above, advertising prevents price semicollusion by firms. If firms are
prohibited from advertising,due to a ban on advertising in the said market, firms would no
longer be curtailed in their ability to collude on price. Thus in the presence of advertising,
consumers would be faced with prices that might be inflated due to the eﬀect of (persuasive)
advertising but shielded from the possibility of price collusion. Without advertising, prices
would no longer be inflated by the eﬀect of (persuasive) advertising. However, since nothing
would restrain the firms from colluding on price, prices faced by the consumer may yet be
higher through this channel.
I now compare the price charged in equilibrium by the two firms in the market in
two regimes: one where firms are free to advertise and the other where firms are prohibited
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from engaging in any kind of advertising. In the following analysis I restrict attention to
the case where the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising is dominant such that firms do
not engage in price semicollusion when they are allowed to advertise (proposition 4). The
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the repeated game, in the regime where firms are allowed
to engage in advertising, is for firms to charge the competitive price pna and set advertising
levels at the competitive level Φna in every period. As such, p
n
a in (2.7) and Φ
n
a in (2.8) are
given by
pna =
aα
a (2β − δ)− γ (γ − λ) (2.14)
and
Φna =
αγ
a (2β − δ)− γ (γ − λ) (2.15)
The subscript is added to indicate that the competitive price and advertising level
above are for the regime in which firms are allowed to engage in advertising.
In the regime where firms are prohibited from engaging in any advertising, under
the assumptions made in this section, the demand curve facing firm 1 and firm 2 respectively
are given by
D1 (p1, p2) = α− βp1 + δp2
and
D2 (p1, p2) = α− βp2 + δp1
As shown in the appendix, firms will always earn higher per period profits if they
collude on price than when they compete on price. The price charged by each firm when
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they collude on price is given by
pcna =
α
2 (β − δ) (2.16)
The superscript and the subscript denote that this is the collusive price (c for
collusion) in the regime where firms are not permitted to advertise (na for no advertising).
I restrict attention to the case where the discount factor by which firms discount
future profits is suﬃciently large such that colluding on price, where each firm charges a
price equal to pcna in eq.(2.15) above, is subgame-perfect
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Thus, consumers face an equilibrium price given by pna when firms are allowed to
engage in advertising, whereas they face an equilibrium price given by pcna when firms are
not allowed to engage in any advertising. As shown in the appendix, pcna is higher than p
n
a
when the following inequality holds
aδ > γ (γ − λ) (2.17)
The collusive price in the no-advertising regime (pcna) is more likely to exceed
the competitive price in the advertising regime (pna) for high values of the advertising cost
parameter a, the cross price eﬀect δ and the net cross eﬀect of advertising λ and for low
values of the net own eﬀect of advertising γ. Higher advertising cost implies low advertising
by firms and thus a lower inflationary impact of persuasive advertising on the price charged
by firms when firms are allowed to advertise. Higher values of the cross-price eﬀect mean
15The condition on the discount factor d is given by:
d ≥ π
c
d−π
c
πcd−π
n
where the subscript na is omitted for simplicity.
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that the goods produced by the two firms are close substitutes. Competition would drive
prices down. Collusion would avoid this downward pressure on prices.
The inequality in 2.17 can also be written as
λ > γ − aδ
γ
(2.18)
Taking the values of a and δ as given, the inequality in 2.18 can be expressed solely
in terms of the magnitude of the net cross eﬀect of advertising (λ) and the net own eﬀect
of advertising (γ) as follows
λ > h (γ) (2.19)
where h (γ) = γ − aδγ .
Proposition 7 The diﬀerence between the competitive price with advertising and the col-
lusive price without advertising is increasing in the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising.
Proof. Follows from the inequality in eq.(2.18)
For any given value of γ, h (γ) gives the critical value of λ such that the equilibrium
price without advertising (pcna) is equal to the equilibrium price with advertising(p
n
a). For
values of λ higher than this threshold level, the equilibrium price without advertising (pcna)
would be higher than the equilibrium price with advertising (pna). This critical value of λ
given by h (γ) increases with γ and is closer to γ the higher γ is. As shown in the appendix,
h (γ) is increasing and concave.
The collusive price in the no-advertising regime is independent of the eﬀects of
advertising. However, the price in the advertising regime is aﬀected by these. A high
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own eﬀect of advertising translates into higher advertising by each firm and thus a higher
inflationary impact of such advertising on price, other things equal. However, if the market-
stealing eﬀect of advertising is also high, each firm’s advertising works to cancel the eﬀect of
the other’s advertising. The inflationary impact of advertising on price is reduced. Thus, if
the advertising is suﬃciently market-stealing, the collusive price without advertising would
be higher than the competitive price with advertising.
Figure 3 shows h (γ) where it divides the parameter space into two regions. In
the region where λ > h (γ), the equilibrium price without advertising (pcna) is higher than
the equilibrium price with advertising (pna) whereas, in the where λ < h (γ), the opposite is
true.
Figure 4 has h (γ) from figure 3 superimposed onto f (γ) from figure 2. Recall that
f (γ) divides the parameter space into two regions such that the region where λ > f (γ),
price semicollusion is not subgame-perfect.
The region above both curves in figure 4 depicts those combinations of λ and γ
such that (1) Firms would compete on both price and advertising in the advertising regime
as price semicollusion would not be subgame-perfect and (2) The collusive price in the
no-advertising regime would be higher than the price in the advertising regime. Thus, the
higher the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising (λ) the greater the likelihood of persuasive
advertising “preventing” price semicollusion and resulting in a lower price.
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2.5 Conclusion
The economics literature has traditionally taken an adverse view of persuasive
advertising. It is thought to be anti-competitive and unlike informative advertising believed
to provide no real benefit to consumers. Prices in markets are believed to be higher than
with persuasive advertising than without.
This paper makes a departure from such a view. It makes a distinction between two
eﬀects of persuasive advertising. These are a market-stealing eﬀect and a market-expanding
eﬀect. Persuasive advertising can induce competition by breaking down collusion on price
between firms when it is market-stealing. In markets without such advertising, firms would
face no impediment in their ability to collude on price. Furthermore, the price that would
prevail in such markets without advertising would be higher than the non-collusive price with
advertising if advertising has a suﬃciently large market-stealing eﬀect. Thus, persuasive
advertising is not necessarily anti-competitive and does not result in a higher equilibrium
price than the one that would prevail without it.
34
Figure 2.1: λ = f (γ)
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Figure 2.2: λ = f (γ)
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Figure 2.3: λ = h (γ)
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Figure 2.4: λ = f (γ) and λ = h (λ)
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Figure 2.5: λ = f1 (γ) when a = a1 (δ = δ1) λ = f2 (γ) when a = a2 (δ = δ2)
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Chapter 3
The Eﬀect of Advertising on Price
Collusion: Evidence from U.S.
Manufacturing
3.1 Introduction
Oligopoly theory sheds light on various factors that may facilitate or hinder price
collusion in a market. Among these, advertising is viewed as one that could make collusion
more diﬃcult to sustain. However, the literature does not provide clear answers as to
exactly how advertising may break down collusion and whether this eﬀect is more likely in
certain industries as opposed to others. The question has received even less attention in the
empirical literature.
According to Lande and Marvel (2000), “antitrust law has long held collusion
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to be paramount among the oﬀenses that it is charged with prohibiting.” Section 1 of
the Sherman Act declares every “conspiracy in the restraint of trade” illegal. In these,
price fixing conspiracies are amongst the most important. Within the European Union,
article 85 of the Roman Treaty makes any cartel that aﬀects trade between member states
illegal. Furthermore, member states have their own competition law that makes cartels
aﬀecting trade within these countries illegal. Given the importance attached to detecting
and successfully prosecuting price fixing conspiracies, identifying industries whose structure
might encourage and sustain such conspiracies should be an area for research to focus
on. Advertising is an important structural characteristic, whose eﬀectiveness and thus,
intensity varies from one industry to another. Its eﬀect on the feasibility and sustainability
of collusion needs to be adequately studied.
The objective of this paper is to provide a clearer understanding of the eﬀect of
advertising on price collusion. It seeks to determine whether advertising in general can
reduce the propensity to collude in an industry. Or, in studying this eﬀect of advertising,
is it important to make any distinction between advertising that is market-stealing and
advertising that is primarily market-expanding. This is first paper to study this distinction.
The motivation for the need to distinguish between the two eﬀects of advertising comes from
the main results in chapter 2 which shows that advertising may prevent collusion when it
is market-stealing but not when it is market-expanding.
The paper also seeks to determine the eﬀect of several other structural industrial
characteristics on the propensity to collude in an industry. To address these questions I
carry out a comparison of industries where firms have been found guilty of price fixing
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with industries without such firms. I construct an original data set from case summaries
of formal legal actions of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
against illegal (explicit) price fixing arrangements from the 1960’s to the present.
The econometric results in the paper suggest the following. Collusion is less likely
in industries with slow growth and high advertising. Also, collusion is less likely in consumer
goods industries with high advertising. These results are consistent with the theoretical
predictions in chapter 2. In addition, the paper also provides evidence that confirms previous
findings that collusion is more likely in industries with a high degree of capital intensity
and with high market growth.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses previous research
that is related to the issue at hand. Section 3.3 outlines the theoretical underpinnings
from chapter 2 that form the main focus of this paper, i.e. the eﬀect of advertising on price
collusion. This is followed by a detailed description of an original data set that is constructed
by combining information from antitrust cases of price fixing with Economic Census data
from the Census Bureau. Section 3.5 presents the empirical methodology adopted in the
paper and discusses some relevant concerns that arise due to the nature of this data set.
Section 3.6 presents the empirical findings.
3.2 Literature Review
The study that is most closely related to this paper is Symeonidis (2003). Syme-
onidis (2003) examines the impact of industry variables on pricing conduct using a data
set on the incidence of collusion across British manufacturing industries in the 1950s. The
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study classifies an industry as cartelized if it had an agreement registered under the 1956
Restrictive Trade Practices Act. Others are classified as non-cartelized. The econometric
results suggest that collusion is more likely the higher are capital intensity and market
growth. Symeonidis (2003) also finds collusion to be less likely in advertising intensive
industries than in low advertising industries. As I argue below, this conclusion may be mis-
leading and may result from two possible drawbacks in the paper. The first is the failure
to distinguish between the two kinds of advertising mentioned above: market-stealing and
market-expanding. The second, which in turn can be partly blamed for the first, is the lack
of suitable data on advertising due to the time period in which the industries are studied.
This paper provides a richer treatment of the eﬀects of advertising on the likelihood of
collusion using U.S. data that is also more recent.
Dick (1996) examines the factors that explain the formation of cartels and their
longevity with the help of a data set of legal, privately enforced export industry cartels that
formed under the Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act of 1918. The Webb-Pomerene Ex-
port Trade Act authorized U.S. exporters to enter into joint selling agreements for oversees
markets. The paper finds that cartels formed more frequently in industries with significant
potential market power and high barriers to entry. However, Dick (1996) does not include
advertising as an industry characteristic aﬀecting cartel formation. Furthermore, his analy-
sis is specific to export cartels, which cover a very small fraction of economic activity and
this limits the applicability of his findings.
There are also a few studies that rely on review of case studies of price fixing agree-
ments and some summary statistics to infer the economic conditions supporting collusion.
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Such studies yield mixed results. For instance, Hay and Kelley (1974) suggest that product
diﬀerentiation hinders collusion (a finding that’s contradicts that of Dick (1996)). Collusion
is more likely in concentrated industries according to Hay and Kelley (1974) and Fraas and
Greer (1977) but not according to Asch and Seneca (1976). Hay and Kelley (1974) find no
link between capital intensity and the incidence of collusion as opposed to Dick (1996) who
finds a positive link between the two.
3.3 Theoretical Model
In this section I briefly outline the main results of the theoretical model presented in
chapter 2. The model draws on Singh and Vives (1984)and has an oligopolistic industry with
two firms. Each firm produces a horizontally diﬀerentiated good. There is also a competitive
numeraire good producing industry. There is a continuum of identical consumers, each with
a utility function separable and linear in the numeraire good. The mass of consumers is
normalized to one without loss of generality. The theoretical model with the results is
discussed in detail in chapter 2, section 2.3. I present a brief description of the model here
for the convenience.
3.3.1 Advertising and Consumer Preferences
The setup of Singh and Vives (1984)is modified to incorporate the presence of ad-
vertising as a choice variable of each firm. Advertising is modeled as aﬀecting the preferences
of the consumers in two possible ways. First, it may enhance the value of the advertised
product in the eye of the consumer. I call this kind of advertising Type A advertising.
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Type A advertising in turn may work in two ways. It may be generic, in the sense that
advertising by firm 1 not only increases the value attached by the consumer to the product
of firm 1 but also the value attached to the product of firm 2. This is especially likely if the
two products are seemingly identical and satisfy similar wants. On the other hand, Type
A advertising may be purely selective. This is the case when advertising by firm 1 only
increases the value attached by the consumer to the product of firm 1.
Second, advertising by a firm may seek to align the preferences of the consumer
more in line with the characteristics of the advertised product. I call this Type B advertising.
Such advertising would increase the value of the advertised product as well as lower the
value of the other product. Type B advertising is thus like a tug of war.1.
The prices charged by firm 1 and firm 2 are denoted by p1 and p2 respectively and
Φ1 and Φ2 are the respective levels of advertising undertaken by them. The quantities of
the two products consumed by the representative consumer are denoted by q1 and q2 respec-
tively. Since the utility function is separable and linear in the numeraire good, consumer’s
problem can be described as the maximization of the (sub) utility function corresponding
to the oligopolistic industry. The consumer selects a pair (q1, q2) to solve:
max u (q1, q2)−
2X
i=1
piqi
where
u (q1, q2) =
2X
i=1
[σ + (ε+ τ)Φi − (ψ − τ)Φj 6=i] qi −
1
2
¡
ωq21 + 2χq1q2 + ωq
2
2
¢
1This is consistent with how the literature on advertising views persuasive advertising aﬀecting consumers’
preferences. For instance see von der Fehr and Stevik (1998).
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The goods are substitutes, independent or complementary depending on whether
χ > 0, χ = 0 or χ < 0. I consider the case where the goods produced by the two firms are
substitutes and assume that ω > χ, i.e. the goods are not perfect substitutes. Note that
χ captures the degree of product diﬀerentiation with high values denoting a high degree of
substitutability and thus a low level of product diﬀerentiation between the two products.
The eﬀect of advertising on the consumer’s utility is captured by the parameters
ε, τ and ψ. The eﬀect of the selective component of Type A advertising is captured by ε,
whereas that of the generic component is captured by τ . The eﬀect of Type B advertising
is captured by ψ.
3.3.2 Demand Functions
The above utility function gives rise to the following demand functions for firm 1
and firm 2 respectively
D1 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α− βp1 + δp2 + γΦ1 − λΦ2 (3.1)
and
D2 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α− βp2 + δp1 + γΦ2 − λΦ1 (3.2)
where
α =
σ
ω + χ
β =
ω
ω2 − χ2
δ =
χ
ω2 − χ2
and where γ is defined as the net own eﬀect of advertising such that γ = ε+τω+χ . Furthermore,
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λ is defined as the magnitude of the cross price eﬀect such that λ = | τ−ψω+χ |2. Note that the
demand functions written above are for the case where ψ > τ . Advertising in such a scenario
is termed as market-stealing. This is because advertising by a firm not only increases it
own demand, but also reduces that of its rival. On the other hand, if τ > ψ, λ would
enter each demand function with a positive sign. Advertising in such a scenario is called
market-expanding. Advertising by a firm increases its own demand as well as that of its
rival. In such a case the demand functions for the two firms would be
D1 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α− βp1 + δp2 + γΦ1 + λΦ2 (3.3)
and
D2 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α− βp2 + δp1 + γΦ2 + λΦ1 (3.4)
A high degree of product diﬀerentiation can be seen as aﬀecting the cross-eﬀect
of advertising in two ways. One, it increases the likelihood of advertising being market-
stealing rather than market-expanding. A higher degree of product diﬀerentiation increases
the eﬃcacy of Type B advertising as captured by the parameter ψ. Advertising that seeks to
align the preferences of the consumer more in line with the characteristics of the advertised
product is more eﬀective when it has greater diﬀerences (real or perceived) between the
products to exploit3. A higher degree of product diﬀerentiation would also reduce the eﬀect
of the generic component of Type A advertising as captured by τ . The more dissimilar the
two products, the smaller is the positive spillover of one firm’s advertising on the other’s
demand4.A higher degree of product diﬀerentiation also translates into a greater magnitude
2Thus, λ = τ−ψω+χ if τ > ψ and λ =
ψ−τ
ω+χ if ψ > τ.
3Formally, this would be represented by ψ as a function of χ, ψ (χ) where ψ0 (χ) < 0. Note that higher
χ implies a lower level of product diﬀerentiation.
4Formally this would be represented by τ as a function of χ, τ (χ) where τ 0 (χ) > 0. Note that higher χ
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of the cross eﬀect of advertising. Recall that higher product diﬀerentiation is represented
by low values of χ, which in turn implies a high value of λ. Thus in product diﬀerentiated
industries advertising is more likely to be market-stealing and this eﬀect is likely to be large
in magnitude.
Note that the distinction that is of paramount importance for the subject of this
paper is between market-stealing and market-expanding advertising as represented by the
two sets of demand functions above. Unlike chapter 2, the empirical analysis and results
of the paper are not restricted to the case of persuasive advertising but can be applied to
the case where advertising has an informative role. What is of primary importance are
the two sets of demand functions representing the alternative eﬀect of advertising. The
assumption of persuasive advertising in the utility function is purely illustrative in this
chapter and is made in order to show how such demand functions can be derived from
the utility maximizing behavior of consumers. The results apply to the case of informative
advertising as well in as much as such advertising is consistent with demand functions where
advertising can have a market-stealing eﬀect. The appendix presents an example of such a
case of informative advertising that yields the identical set of demand functions as those in
eq.(3.1) and eq.(3.2).
3.3.3 Firm Behavior
Firm interaction is considered in the framework of an infinitely repeated game,
such that in each period firms choose their price and advertising levels. Two possibilities of
firm-behavior are considered. First, firms may compete with each other on both price and
implies a lower level of product diﬀerentiation.
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advertising and earn the Nash equilibrium (competitive) profits in each period denoted by
πn. Or, firms may choose to set prices collusively and advertising levels independently in
each period. In such a case each firm will earn the collusive profit in each period denoted
by πc. Considering only grim-trigger strategies for the firms, collusion can emerge as a
sub-game-perfect outcome of the game only when πc − πn > 0.
For given values of the parameters a, α, β and δ, the each firm’s profit under
collusion (πc) as well as that under competition (πn),can be expressed purely in terms of
the net own eﬀect of advertising (γ) and the magnitude of the net cross eﬀect (λ). Thus,
the diﬀerence between the profit of each firm under collusion and that under competition
(πc − πn) can be expressed as a function of γ and λ. This function is denoted by F (γ, λ)
3.3.4 Price Collusion under Market-Expanding Advertising
The function F (γ, λ) > 0 when advertising is market-expanding. Under collusion
not only is the price higher but so is the (independently set) level of advertising of each
firm. The former is an obvious consequence of the elimination of the motive to undercut
one’s rival’s price. The latter follows from the higher price that each firm now earns due
to collusion. With a higher price on each unit of output, the incentive to expand demand
through advertising is stronger. When the net cross eﬀect of advertising is positive, a firm
benefits from the advertising of another firm in the industry. Under collusion, firms benefit
both from the higher price that results directly from the collusion and the higher advertising
by each firm that follows as a consequence. Thus, the profits of firms under price collusion
are always higher than those under competition when advertising is market-expanding5.
5This result extends to the case where λ = 0, i.e. when advertising has no cross eﬀect.
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This is independent of the magnitude of the market-expanding eﬀect. For a high enough
discount factor, price collusion in each period can be a sub-game perfect outcome.
3.3.5 Price Collusion under Market-Stealing Advertising
The case where advertising is market-stealing is diﬀerent. On the one hand, firms
benefit from the higher price that is the direct consequence of collusion. However, firms
advertise more as a result of the higher price under collusion. Owing to combativeness of
advertising, higher advertising by both firms adversely aﬀects their profits much more than
under competition. The latter eﬀect may be strong enough to negate all the gains from
price collusion, such that each firm’s profit under collusion is lower than under competition,
i.e., F (γ, λ) < 0. In such a case, price collusion can not be a sub-game perfect outcome of
the infinitely repeated game. Figure 1 depicts the implicit function λ = f (γ) that is defined
by F (γ, λ) = 0. As such, it represents those combinations of values of γ and λ such that
each firm’s profit is equal under collusion and competition. For values of γ and λ above
(below) the curve, F (γ, λ) < 0 (F (γ, λ) < 0). Using the terminology adopted in chapter
2, the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising is said to be dominant when λ > f (γ). In such
a case, the intensified advertising that necessarily accompanies price collusion, negates all
the gains of that collusion. In such a case collusion will not be sub-game perfect. On the
other hand, when λ < f (γ), the market-stealing eﬀect is not dominant and advertising
competition does not outweigh the gains from collusion for the firms. Collusion can be
sub-game perfect as long as each firm values the future suﬃciently.
Thus when advertising is market-expanding or when the market-stealing eﬀect is
not dominant, it poses no impediment in the ability of firms to successfully collude on price.
50
This is not the case when the market-stealing eﬀect is dominant (λ > f (γ)). Firms do not
benefit from price collusion in such a case as price collusion and the resulting higher price
leads to intensified competition on advertising. Since advertising is highly market-stealing,
the result of this intensified competition on advertising is lower profits for each firm and
the breakdown of collusion.
Furthermore, as discussed above, not only is advertising likely to be market-
stealing in industries with greater product diﬀerentiation but the magnitude of this eﬀect
is also likely to be higher in such industries. Section 3.5.3 discusses the empirical strategies
used in identifying industries where the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising is likely to be
dominant.
3.4 Data Set
The construction of the data set involves the collection of a group of collusive
industries which is then compared with a non-collusive group. The comparison is done
in terms of several industry characteristics which are described below and data on which,
for the most part, are available in the Economic Census that is carried out by the Census
Bureau every five years.
3.4.1 Collusive Industries
The most comprehensive and readily accessible source of historical records for an-
titrust cases filed by the DOJ is the Trade Regulation Reporter (TRR) published by Com-
merce Clearing House. The TRR reports a case summary of a DOJ indictment that contains
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the list of defendants, which includes individuals, corporations and trade associations (where
applicable), the nature of the conspiracy that the defendants allegedly participated in, the
duration of the conspiracy, the products involved in the conspiracy, the geographical scope
of the alleged conspiracy, the regional division and the oﬃcial heading the investigation
and lastly the ultimate settlement of the case. Often there is supplementary information as
well, including the market share accounted for by the firms involved in the conspiracy and
the total sales of the product in the relevant period. Some cases summaries also include
details about how the conspiracy was actually carried out such as the time and location of
meetings of alleged coconspirators.
The first step in constructing a sample of collusive industries was the selection of
cases of price fixing that were initiated between 1960 and 2003. There were three criteria
that were used in the selection of this preliminary sample: first, the corporations, individuals
or trade associations had to be charged with explicit (horizontal) price fixing. Second,
only cases from the manufacturing sector were included. Third, for a case to be included
in the sample, the ultimate settlement of the case had to be adverse to the defendants.
For this, consent settlements and nolo contondre6 pleas were included along with adverse
trial decisions while acquittals, dismissals and withdrawals were not included. Using these
criteria a preliminary sample of 156 cases was collected.
To construct the preliminary sample of collusive industries each product listed in
the price fixing cases selected thus far, was mapped into a four-digit Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) code that identifies an industry. Each product was first mapped into
6A nolo contondre plea is one where the defendent does not contest the charge and is usually seen as a
victory for the prosecuting authorities. It seems plausible to assume that such pleas would occur in cases
where the trial decision is fairly certain.
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a six-digit North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) code with the help of
the NAICS search function on the Economic Census Website or with the help of Websters
online business dictionary. The NAICS code was then mapped into the SIC code with the
help of the bridge between NAICS and SIC on the Census Bureau website. 7. A collusive
industry was thus uniquely identified by its four-digit SIC code. Each collusive industry in
the preliminary sample was then paired with a single census year depending on the time
period of the price fixing conspiracy as given in the case summary of the DOJ indictment
in the TRR. Often, the duration of the conspiracy was such that it could be paired with
more than one census year. In such cases the earliest census year was chosen. The reason
for doing this is discussed in detail in section 3.5.6 on potential endogeneity.
The above process year yielded 226 unique industry-year pairs in which one or
more of the constituent products of an industry was subject to a price fixing conspiracy8.
In this there are industries where collusion has been detected more than once. Accounting
for such industries so that they are counted only once I get a total of 138 unique industries
that are classified as collusive.
It is worth noting that under this classification, when an industry is classified as
collusive it does not imply that all products in the industry in the given year were subject
to price-fixing conspiracies. An industry is classified as collusive even if a single product
that falls within that industry was subject to a price-fixing conspiracy.
7The SIC was used for censuses prior to the one in 1997 and was replaced by the NAICS in 1997. Only
for about forty percent of the industries is the mapping between SIC and NAICS one-to-one. For others the
mapping was done with the knowledge of the constituent collusive product (i.e common to both).
8The reason for the number of cases being diﬀerent from the industry-year pairs is that often the product
that is the subject of a price-fixing conspiracy maps into more than one industry. For instance the product
chain-link fence maps into the two SIC codes 3496 and 3315. Sometimes two or more products map into the
same industry, for eg. artificial abrasive grain and industrial diamonds both map into the SIC code 3291.
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The above sample was modified by eliminating all price fixing conspiracies that
were not national in scope. Such agreements were restricted to the sale of the relevant
product in a limited local or regional market by firms that typically operated only in those
markets9. The rationale for excluding local and regional cases of price fixing is the use of
census data for industry variables. These variables are measured at the national level and
using them to derive any inferences about price fixing that only covers local or regional
markets would lead one to draw incorrect conclusions.
Over the years the Census Bureau has added a number of industry variables to the
list of those that it gathers data on and reports in the Economic Census. As a consequence,
while the recent censuses have most of the industry variables that are required for this study
the same is not true for earlier censuses. For this reason only data from three census years,
namely 1987, 1992 and 1997 are used in this paper. Thus, in the final sample of collusive
industries only those are included that have been paired with one of the above three census
years. This yields a final sample of 65 collusive industries each paired with only one of the
three census years listed above.
A question that can reasonably be asked with regards to the pairing of collusive
industries with corresponding census years is why an industry with a price-fixing conspiracy
long enough for it to be paired with more than one census year is paired with a single (and
earliest possible) census year. As an example, consider an industry with a price-fixing
conspiracy that lasted between 1987 and 1992. Given that only data from the three census
years, 1987, 1992 and 1997 is used in this paper, one possibility is to construct a panel
9An exception was made regarding agreements that covered a large proportion of the national market
and involved firms that operated on a national scale and were typically national market leaders
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of industries with three data points for each industry corresponding to the three census
years. In such a panel the classification of the industry (as collusive or noncollusive) could
be determined by the presence and duration of a price fixing conspiracy in that industry.
For instance, the above industry could be classified as collusive in the years 1987 and 1992
but noncollusive in 1997.
The fundamental problem in this approach lies in the uncertain status of the
hypothetical industry in the year 1997. Specifically one cannot be sure if the industry should
be classified as noncollusive in that year. The reason being that the absence of collusion in
the industry could be due to unfavorable industry conditions that make collusion diﬃcult
to sustain, which indeed constitutes the subject of this chapter. Or, and herein lies the
problem, the absence of collusion could be due to the fact that the firms in the industry
were caught and charged with colluding in the past and are under scrutiny by the DOJ. In
such a scenario even though the industry characteristics may be such that they give rise to
a high propensity to collude this would not result in actual collusion by firms.
The objective of this paper is to study the impact of several industry characteristics
on the propensity to collude in an industry. Since the latter is unobservable, observed
collusive conduct in an industry is taken as an indicator of a high propensity to collude in
that industry. However, if firms in an industry have been found guilty of collusion in the
past, and the industry is under scrutiny by antitrust authorities on that account, a high
propensity to collude is less likely to lead to actual price collusion, such that the latter no
longer remains a good indicator of the former. It is for this reason that the use of a panel
is avoided and instead each industry is paired with only one census year10.
10As is explained below, if an industry is classified as collusive in any given year (even if that year is not
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However, the construction and use of a panel of industries would be extremely
useful in empirically testing the another prediction of the theoretical model described in
chapter 2. This is the proposition that the equilibrium advertising in an industry will
be higher when pricing conduct in the industry is collusive rather than competitive. The
panel would enable the use of industries that underwent a change in pricing conduct (from
collusive to noncollusive) as a treatment group and other industries that underwent no
change in pricing conduct as a control group. If advertising is found to exhibit a significant
decline in the former group but not in the latter, this would constitute as evidence in support
of the theoretical prediction. However, this is the subject of a future study.
3.4.2 Price Collusion and Advertising Competition
The theoretical model outlined in Section 3.3 and studied in detail in chapter 2,
describes the behavior of firms under collusion as jointly setting prices but setting advertis-
ing levels independently. It is thus a model of price collusion and advertising competition.
It needs to be asked how accurate such a characterization of firm behavior is and how it
measures up to actual cases of price fixing that are used in constructing the sample of
collusive industries in Section 3.4.1.
Typically, the price fixing cases in the sample have the defendants being charged
with setting minimum or fixed prices and standard conditions of sale. However, there were
no cases where firms were accused of either restricting or otherwise collectively deciding on
advertising in addition to fixing prices. The reason for this could not be a lack of interest on
the part of antitrust authorities in such agreements. This is borne out by several instances
included in the final sample years) the industry is never classified as noncollusive.
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where firms have entered into agreements to restrict advertising (independent of any price
fixing) that have been investigated by the DOJ. An example of firms being prosecuted
for colluding on advertising by the DOJ is that of five Iowa hospitals11. These hospitals
were charged by the DOJ with “agreeing to limit the dollar amount spent on advertising”.
The hospitals agreed not to make “claims that would be considered image building or self-
aggrandizement”. There was no accompanying charge of price-fixing. The decree passed
prohibited the defendants from “entering into any future agreements about the amount of
advertising they use”. Thus, the lack of accompanying charges of advertising collusion in
all the price fixing cases used to construct the sample of collusive industries, given that
such an oﬀense has been investigated and prosecuted by the DOJ separately from price
fixing allows one to make the reasonable conclusion that firms colluding on price do not
necessarily collude on advertising. This conclusion is further reinforced from a survey of
the price-fixing agreements that constitute the sample studied in Symeonidis (2003). After
studying the price fixing agreements that were registered in 1956 in the U.K., Symeonidis
(2003) finds that “there were in general no restrictions regarding capital investment, media
advertising or R&D expenditure”.
However, the observation that firms colluding on price do not attempt to reduce
the intensity of non-price competition such as in advertising poses the question why firms
actually engage in such behavior. Why don’t firms colluding on price attempt to collude
in other dimensions of their interaction like advertising? I believe that at least part of the
answer to this question lies in particular industry characteristics and industry norms that
may facilitate price collusion but not other forms of collusion.
11For details on the case see Commerce Clearing House Trade Regulation Report 1992.
57
An example of an industry characteristic that lends itself to facilitating price fixing
is the presence of a trade association. Indeed, in a number of price fixing cases surveyed in
this study trade associations figure prominently as defendants along with the firms partici-
pating in the conspiracy. Trade associations can work to make the price of firms public in an
environment where they may not be, such as in the case where sales are made privately to
large customers. This makes a collusive agreement easier to monitor and sustain. Equally
important, trade associations may act as a mechanism for coordinating on a collusive price
and adjusting it in response to a change in the external environment. One possible way that
firms may do this is to announce a future price increase through a trade association. The
firm would follow up on the announced price increase if it has been met with similar an-
nouncements by other firms but would retract it if other firms do not respond appropriately.
Firms could iterate back and forth until they reach a mutually agreeable price. Furthermore
such a practice can be justified by firms (to antitrust authorities) on the grounds of “sound
business practices” that benefits consumers can get information on prices of all firms at one
location and who are informed of price increases in advance and can adjust their behavior
accordingly. Trade associations can not be used to facilitate collusion on advertising in the
same way partly because firms cannot make the case that sharing information on advertis-
ing through trade associations is of any benefit to consumers. An industry-wide practice
of issuing press notices on future price increases serves a similar purpose and is similarly
justified by firms. Such behavior corresponds to actual cases of price fixing such as the
one involving manufacturers of an antiknock compound for gasoline in 198412 and the 1993
case against eight major airlines where instead of a trade association, the Airline Tariﬀ and
12See Hay (1999)
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Publishing Company was used as a coordinating mechanism13.
The industry-wide norm of oﬀering "most favored customer" clauses in an industry
is another feature that helps in sustaining price collusion but not advertising collusion. A
"most-favored customer" clause lowers the incentive from deviating from a collusive price
by oﬀering a lower price to gain a customer, particularly when sales are made privately to
large customers. By committing to oﬀer same discounts to all customers, a firm eﬀectively
reduces the benefit of oﬀering a discount to a new customer. "Most favored customer
clauses" not only create a disincentive for cheating, they also reduce the uncertainty about
a rival’s pricing policy in general and male collusion easier. Again, such a policy can be
explained away by firms as a "sound business practice".
Thus, there are arrangements in industries that can facilitate price collusion and
can by justified as ostensibly serving competitive purposes but cannot be used to facilitate
advertising collusion. Firms may also feel less of a need for advertising collusion as opposed
to price collusion. Price competition is the most direct form of competition that produces
gains that are short lived and easily replicated as opposed to advertising that may generate
brand loyalty. Thus firms’ incentives to curtail price competition may be the strongest14.
3.4.3 Non Collusive Industries
An industry is classified as non-collusive if there has never been any price-fixing
case by the DOJ in that industry for the period for which the antitrust case summaries are
used in this paper (including regional and local cases). This eliminates 138 industries that
13See Borenstein (1999).
14Deltas and Serfes (2002) provide a theoretical model where firms may find it more beneficial to engage
in semicollusion as opposed to full collusion in the presence of demand uncertainty.
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comprise the preliminary sample of collusive industries from the set of all possible four-digit
SIC industries. Each non-collusive industry thus classified in this sample is then randomly
paired with one of the three census years being considered. After dropping industries with
missing data, there are 272 industries that comprise the group of non-collusive industries.
In the empirical analysis,the group of 65 collusive industries is compared to the group of
272 non-collusive industries.
3.4.4 Sample Selection
Before one embarks on the use of the constructed data set for empirical estima-
tion, acknowledgment of possible weaknesses in that data set is in order. The data set is
constructed by including industries where the Antitrust Division of the DOJ successfully
prosecuted cases of price fixing and this very fact leaves it prone to selection issues. For
instance, it can be asked whether this constructed sample represents industries that are
collusive or those that have some characteristics that make for easier prosecution by the
DOJ. In the latter case, comparing industry characteristics of this group with those of a
non-collusive group may pick up diﬀerences between the two that make for successful an-
titrust legislation rather than the determinants of price collusion which is the subject of
this paper.
The constructed sample of collusive industries does not include all collusive indus-
tries but simply those that get caught and are then tried successfully by the DOJ. As such
it can be argued, that such cases of collusion would be the weakest. The argument could
take the line that since the known cases of price fixing by definition involve firms that get
caught, there may be something inherent in those agreements that made them predestined
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to fail. One possibility being that such industries did not have characteristics conducive
for successful price collusion. Therefore, by studying characteristics of such industries one
would not draw inferences about what makes collusion more likely, but instead what makes
collusion easier to detect and therefore more likely to fail.
Dick (1996) criticizes the use of antitrust data in the early studies that reviewed
case histories of prosecuted price-fixing agreements to infer the economic conditions support-
ing collusion. He points out that by selecting cases based on their prosecution status, these
studies failed to separate cleanly the determinants of cartel formation from those guiding
successful antitrust enforcement. The result, according to him, was biased sampling that
led to misleading interpretation of the evidence. Since this paper also relies on data from
antitrust cases, its important to eﬀectively justify the use of this data by dealing with the
principal concern about the data that is raised by Dick (1996). Dick argues that because
low industry concentration and high cartel membership increases the cartel’s visibility to
antitrust enforcement agencies, cartels with these features will appear more numerous in
these studies leading them to make misleading conclusions regarding the correlation be-
tween industry concentration (and the number of firms) and the incidence of price fixing in
an industry.
I disagree with such arguments on two counts. The first owes to the inherent
randomness in the process by which typical cases of price fixing are detected. According
to Posner (1970) the Department of Justice’s price-fixing cases are frequently based on tips
and testimony of defecting conspirators or disgruntled employees. The larger the number of
conspirators the higher the likelihood of such evidence turning up and leading to prosecution
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by the DOJ. If tips and testimony by sources related to the number of conspirators were the
only sources of information leading to detection and prosecution of price-fixing cases, then
the use of data from such cases will certainly lead to incorrect inferences about the eﬀect
of industry concentration on price-fixing. However, this is clearly not the case. As Posner
(1970) himself points out, buyers are an extremely important source of information.
A survey of the price-fixing conspiracies used in this paper throws up some in-
teresting facts about how these agreements get detected by the DOJ. Frequently, DOJ
investigation into possible price-fixing are triggered by completely unrelated events. For
example the DOJ may level a charge against a firm or an employee that is unrelated to
price-fixing but a detailed investigation into the firm’s accounts and operations may throw
up evidence of other wrongdoing including price-fixing. This then triggers a specific investi-
gation into price-fixing. Hay and Kelley (1974) have presented information on the means of
detection for those cases within their sample for which such information is available. They
find that detection through sources which might be related to the number of conspirators
occurred in only 15 cases (30%). In other cases, detection was eﬀected through processes
independent of the number of conspirators. This evidence would suggests that it is not
significantly easier to detect a price-fixing conspiracy involving a large number of conspir-
ators than one involving only a few parties. On the basis of the above discussion it seems
reasonable to conclude that the possibility of any bias arising from a systematic relationship
between the number of conspirators and the likelihood of detection is low.
Second, it can be argued, equally persuasively, that the cases of price fixing that
are actually caught and brought to trial successfully are not the weakest but in some sense
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the most blatant and thus the strongest (amongst explicit price-fixing arrangements). Given
the risks attached to being caught (and given that the DOJ’s stand on such issues has never
been in doubt), one participates in such a conspiracy only if the rewards are suﬃciently
high. Thus the industries in which price fixing cases have been detected and the defen-
dants successfully tried would have characteristics that make for the strongest incentives
for collusion. Fraas and Greer (1977) argue that as structural conditions vary from most
favorable to least favorable for the emergence of collusive behavior, and as legal sanctions
apply, conduct of firms ranges from tacit collusion to explicit price collusion to independent
action. Their reasoning for this is that since the purpose of all collusion is maximization
of joint profits, the incidence of specific types of collusion will depend of firms fulfilling
this purpose while minimizing legal risk. Thus, explicit collusion will occur when it is both
possible and necessary for joint maximization of profits.
Data on industry variables is discussed in the next section on the empirical method-
ology adopted in the paper.
3.5 Empirical Methodology
3.5.1 Industry Variables
Oligopoly theory and previous empirical research, most notably, Symeonidis (2003),
provide an extensive list of industry variables that may aﬀect the likelihood of collusion in
a given industry and are thus included in this paper. Following is a definition of industry
variables used in the empirical estimation and a brief discussion of how each is expected
to impact the likelihood of collusion on the basis of the theoretical literature and previous
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empirical research.
A higher rate of growth in industry sales is believed to increase the likelihood
of collusion in an industry, other things being equal. Higher market growth increases the
weight firms attach to future profits relative to current profits. This reduces the incentive
of a firm to deviate from a collusive agreement in the present. The market growth for an
industry is calculated as the ratio of the value of shipments between the current census and
the preceding census minus the inflation rate15 for the relevant period. This is the variable
GROWTH which is used to construct the variables INV GROWTH and GD used in
alternate specifications. The variable INV GROWTH is simply calculated as 1GROWTH .
Thus, low values of this variable are expected to be associated with a higher likelihood of
collusion on the basis of the above discussion. The dummy variable GD classifies an industry
as a low-growth industry and takes the value 1 for industries with lower than median market
growth in the sample.
The ease with which entry can occur in an industry constrains a price-fixing cartel’s
profitability. Barriers to entry increase the likelihood of collusion. By making entry more
diﬃcult,the gains from collusion are more diﬃcult to eliminate. Economies of scale and
large sunk costs in an industry act as entry barriers. Collusion monitoring costs are also
lower when firms must sink specific investments to enter the industry. If a cheating firm is
punished by forfeiting the future collusive return on its sunk assets, its incentive to deviate
by undercutting the collusive price is weakened. The measure of economies of scale used
for each industry is capital intensity. Two alternative measures of capital intensity are
used. The first, LNCAPINT1 is the natural logarithm of the total value of assets in
15The inflation rate for the relevant period is calculated using the inflation calculator on the BLS website.
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the industry divided by the number of establishments. The second, LNCAPINT2, is the
natural logarithm of the total capital expenditure in the industry divided by the value of
shipments.
Industry concentration could strengthen the incentive for firms to collude on price.
First, with fewer members in a price-fixing cartel, the share of each in the cartel profit is
higher. Secondly, with fewer firms, monitoring of the collusive agreement becomes easier
and the incentive to cheat consequently lower. However, the data in this study is on explicit
collusion. With high industry concentration the need for explicit price-fixing agreements as
opposed to tacit collusion may be obviated for the very reasons that make collusion easier
to sustain as stated above. Thus, explicit collusion would be unnecessary at very high
levels of industry concentration and unfeasible at very low levels of concentration. For this
reason industry concentration as measured by the four-firm concentration ratio16 enters the
estimation equation, both as a level term CONC and a squared term CONC2 .
The eﬀect of product diﬀerentiation on the incidence of collusion is not certain.
Diﬀerentiation may raise the cost of enforcing collusion as product quality and style diﬀer-
ences must be identified and monitored to deter cheating along non-price lines. However,
if buyers’ markets for goods are relatively atomistic (due to high product diﬀerentiation),
price cuts to individual buyers would be relatively unprofitable and the incentive to deviate
from a collusive agreement weaker. The paper only considers horizontal product diﬀerenti-
ation. The measure relies on the distinction between consumer-goods industries and others.
It is constructed by using the end-use classification of industries to divide industries into
16Alternate specifications not reported in the paper use the eight-firm concentration ratio and the
herschman-herfindahl index which yield similar results.
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consumer goods industries and non-consumer goods industries17. This is a commonly used
measure of product diﬀerentiation and is used by Dick (1996) to study the determinants
of export cartel formation. The underlying belief is that consumer goods industries are
associated with a higher degree of (horizontal) product diﬀerentiation than other industries
(capital goods, producer goods, primary goods, intermediate goods etc.). Thus the measure
of product diﬀerentiation used in the estimation equation, PD, is a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 if the industry in question is a consumer goods industry and 0 otherwise.
An alternative measure of product diﬀerentiation considered in the paper is the
trade overlap index of an industry. The trade overlap index for industry i, TOIi, is calcu-
lated as follows
TOIi =
Min(Xik,Mik)
Max(Xik,Mik)
where Xik are country i’s exports in industry k while, Mik denotes country i’s
imports in industry k. The trade overlap index measures the extent of overlap between
imports and exports in international trade of a country for a given industry. Industry
trade is classified as two-way for large values of the trade overlap index (close to one).
Product diﬀerentiation is cited as the reason for intra-industry trade in the International
Trade literature18. This underlies the rational for capturing product diﬀerentiation using a
measure of intra-industry trade.
A dummy variable is constructed, TOID, that takes the value 1 for industries
17End-use classification is an alternative classification of industries. These were mapped into NAICS which
in turn were mapped into SIC. Each SIC code was then classified as consumer-goods or nonconsumer-goods
on the basis of the corresponding end-use classification code(s).
18Another reason along with product diﬀerentiation that is given to explain intra-industry trade is the
presence of economies of scale in the industry. This is explicitly controlled for by the capital intensity
variable.
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that have a trade overlap index higher than the median and 0 for industries with lower than
the median trade overlap index in the sample. Thus, this variables classifies an industry as
product diﬀerentiated if it has a high trade overlap index. This follows the methodology
adopted by Chiarlone (2000) and Freudenberg and Muller (1992) who use a similar binary
variable constructed from the trade overlap index to classify industries as product diﬀer-
entiated or homogeneous. Data on imports and exports at the industry level are obtained
from the United States International Trade Commission website. The trade overlap index
was calculated for the years 1987-1996. The dummy variable TOID was constructed using
the average of the TOI over all the years.
3.5.2 Advertising
The focus of this paper is the eﬀect of advertising on the likelihood of collusion in an
industry. The prevalent view in the literature is that higher advertising intensity (measured
as the ratio of advertising expenditure and sales) should reduce the attractiveness of price
collusion for firms. One possible reason given for this is that advertising may induce vertical
diﬀerentiation or “perceived quality” diﬀerences and these make coordination on a collusive
price more diﬃcult. Some authors also identify industries with high advertising intensity
as industries with high product diﬀerentiation. For instance, Symeonidis (2003) explains
the negative association between advertising intensity and the likelihood of collusion in the
U.K. on these lines. However, this paper makes a departure from such studies by separately
accounting for product diﬀerentiation (discussed below). More importantly, as shown in the
theoretical model outlined earlier, the eﬀect of advertising may diﬀer depending on whether
it is market-stealing or market-expanding. Only when advertising is market-stealing and
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this eﬀect is dominant, does advertising present an impediment in sustaining a successful
price-fixing agreement. The reason for this is that only under such a scenario, intensified
competition in advertising, which inevitably follows price collusion, can outweigh the gains
of that price collusion.
Advertising intensity at the industry level is measured as the ratio of purchased
advertising services to the value of product shipments, both of which are reported in the
Economic Census. This variable is denoted by ADINT in the estimation equation.
Alternatively, an industry is classified as a high-advertising industry if the advertis-
ing intensity in that industry is higher than the median advertising intensity in the sample.
This is captured by the dummy variable AD that takes the value 1 for high-advertising
industries and 0 otherwise.
The availability of such data from a common source is one of the improvements
over previous research that have relied on relatively imprecise data from various diﬀerent
sources to construct measures for advertising intensity that have been subject to a fair
degree of measurement error.
3.5.3 Market-Stealing Advertising
The primary purpose of this chapter is to empirically determine if advertising
competition can aﬀect the likelihood of price collusion in a manner consistent with the
theoretical model presented in detail in chapter 2. The model yields two predictions. First,
the equilibrium level of advertising in an industry is higher when pricing conduct in the
industry is collusive rather than competitive. This is because the prospect of earning a
higher price through collusion gives each firm a stronger incentive to expand its demand
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through advertising, thus leading to higher overall advertising in the industry. Second,
the intensified advertising competition that results from an attempt at price collusion can
undermine that very attempt. Advertising competition can possibly negate all the gains
from price collusion leading to a break down in the collusion. This is the case in industries
where advertising is market-stealing and where the market-stealing eﬀect is dominant.
In terms of the parameters of the theoretical model, an industry with dominant
market-stealing advertising is one where λ > f(γ). Recall that γ is the own-eﬀect of ad-
vertising and measures the private benefit a firm derives from one of unit of advertising.
This benefit is the increase in the firm’s demand due to advertising. The own-eﬀect of
advertising thus determines how much advertising a firm will engage in, with a higher value
of γ implying a higher level of advertising by each firm and thus a higher level of equilib-
rium industry advertising as well. On the other hand, λ captures the magnitude of the
market-stealing eﬀect. This is the adverse eﬀect of one firm’s advertising on the other’s
demand. If one could observe these parameter values for each industry, industries with
dominant market-stealing advertising could be identified. Observation of a lower likelihood
of collusion in such industries as opposed to others would constitute evidence in support
of the theoretical model. However, one obviously cannot observe underlying industry char-
acteristics represented by the parameters γ and λ. The approach taken in this paper is to
rely on observed industry characteristics and utilize these in drawing inferences about the
associated underlying parameters.
Figure 2.2 depicts the parameter space where the market-stealing eﬀect is dominant
and advertising competition breaks down an attempt at price collusion. This is the region
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lying above the λ = f(γ) curve. Note that a high magnitude of the market-stealing eﬀect
is neither necessary not suﬃcient in order for the market-stealing eﬀect to be dominant. A
high value for the magnitude is insuﬃcient to negate the gains of price collusion by itself
when the corresponding own-eﬀect of advertising, γ, is small in magnitude. A low magnitude
of the own-eﬀect implies a low level of equilibrium advertising for the industry. In such a
scenario even if the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising were large, advertising competition
would not negate all the gains from price collusion. This is because firms in the industry
do not engage in an adequate level of advertising for the market-stealing eﬀect to have a
significant impact. Advertising in such industries is largely inconsequential. Thus, what
makes the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising dominant in an industry is a combination
of two factors: a large magnitude of the market-stealing eﬀect (high value of λ) and and a
large magnitude of the own-eﬀect of advertising (a high value of γ).
The paper adopts two approaches to empirically identify industries with domi-
nant market-stealing advertising. The first approach identifies an industry with dominant
market-stealing advertising as one that is characterized by low market-growth and high
advertising. As part of this approach, first industries with low market growth are identi-
fied as those where advertising is market-stealing and where this market-stealing eﬀect is
significant in magnitude. In the absence of market expansion (growth), high advertising by
a firm could only be raising demand for the advertising firm by diverting (or tending to
divert) demand from other firms. The observation of negligible or low market growth in an
industry would lead to the reasonable conclusion that any benefit to an advertising firm in
terms of increased demand is unlikely to spill over to other firms and in fact would most
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likely come at the cost of reduced demand for other firms in the industry. Thus, as part of
the first empirical strategy, the observation of low market growth in an industry is taken as
an indicator of a high magnitude of the market-stealing eﬀect (λ).
However, this is not suﬃcient in identifying dominant market-stealing advertising
industries as a high magnitude of the market-stealing eﬀect does not by itself guarantee
dominant market-stealing advertising. For this the accompanying own-eﬀect of advertising
is also required to be suﬃciently large. High observed advertising in an industry is taken
as an indicator of a high magnitude of the own-eﬀect (γ) in that industry. The reasoning
behind this is straightforward. Since the own-eﬀect captures the private benefit that accrues
to a firm from one unit of advertising, the level of advertising undertaken by each firm and
consequently the aggregate level of advertising in the industry is directly aﬀected by the
own-eﬀect.
Thus, the first approach uses observed market growth in an industry to derive
information on the underlying magnitude of the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising (λ)
in that industry. While low market growth is taken as an indicator of significant market-
stealing eﬀect of advertising, the observation of high market growth does not imply that
advertising is market-expanding as the market expansion may be independent of advertising.
Furthermore, this approach uses observed industry advertising to draw an inference on the
magnitude of the own-eﬀect of advertising (γ), with the observation of high advertising
taken as reflecting a high magnitude of the own-eﬀect.
Two versions of this empirical strategy are implemented in the paper. The first
uses a dummy variable, MSAD1, to classify an industry as one with dominant market-
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stealing advertising. The variable takes the value 1 for for an industry, if the industry is
characterized by both higher advertising intensity than the median advertising intensity in
the sample and lower market growth than the median growth rate in the sample19. In
an alternative specification I construct a continuous variable MSA1 as the product of the
advertising growth in an industry and the inverse of the market growth. Thus, high values
of MSA1 reflect high advertising in conjunction with low market growth, precisely the
scenario where the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising is likely to be dominant as per the
rationale underlining the first identification strategy.
It deserves mention that advertising need not necessarily be persuasive in order
for the empirical strategy to accurately identify industries with dominant market-stealing
advertising. The validity of using low market growth to identify industries with market-
stealing advertising is unaﬀected by whether advertising is informative or persuasive. Simi-
larly the link between a high magnitude of the own-eﬀect of advertising in an industry and
high level of observed industry advertising would hold irrespective of whether advertising
is informative or persuasive.
The second approach adopted in this paper to empirically identify industries with
dominant market-stealing advertising utilizes diﬀerences in the extent of product diﬀeren-
tiation between industries. There are two reasons why advertising can be expected to be
more market-stealing in industries with a greater degree of product diﬀerentiation as op-
posed to relatively homogenous product industries. First, advertising that highlights some
product attributes of the advertised product exerts no positive spillover on other products
19The dummy variable MSAD1 is thus an interaction of high advertising dummy AD and a low-growth
dummy GD as described above.
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and thus cannot be market-expanding if these attributes are not shared by all products in
the industry20. Thus, the potential for market-expanding advertising is limited in industries
with a greater degree of product diﬀerentiation.
Second, given the existence of product diﬀerences, a firm may choose to engage in
advertising that highlights these diﬀerences and makes the consumers value these diﬀerences
more. Such advertising would result in higher demand for the advertised product as well as
lower demand for the other (diﬀerent) products in the industry. In other words, the potential
for market-stealing advertising is higher in industries with a greater degree of product
diﬀerentiation. Analogous reasoning that applies to the case of informative advertising is
presented in the appendix to this chapter.
The measure of product diﬀerentiation used in this paper is a consumer goods
industry dummy variable (as explained above). Given the rationale underlying the second
strategy, this variable can also help identify industries where advertising is likely to have
a significant market-stealing eﬀect (λ). Once again, high observed industry advertising is
taken as an indicator of a high magnitude of the own-eﬀect of advertising (γ). Taken to-
gether, the second strategy identifies product diﬀerentiated industries with high advertising
as those with dominant market-stealing advertising. This is represented by the dummy vari-
able MSAD2 that takes the value one for an industry if it is a high advertising consumer
goods industry21
20Again, the reasoning applies to the case of both informative and persuasive advertising. Informative
advertising that informs consumers about the benefits of a product arising out of some specific attributes
will only aﬀect the demand of the advertised product if the attributes are unique to that product. Simi-
larly, persuasive advertising that seeks to raise the demand for a product by making consumers value some
attributes of the advertised product will not aﬀect the demand for other products in the industry if the
attributes are not shared amongst the diﬀerent products.
21Thus, MSAD2 is an interaction of the thet wo dummy variables PD and AD.
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The diﬀerent indices of dominant market-stealing advertising are used in alternate
specifications.
3.5.4 Data Description
Table 3.1 summarizes the distribution of collusive and non-collusive industries
across manufacturing industry-groups in the sample. Fourteen industry-groups have been
identified and are represented by 3-digit SIC codes or when appropriate, by a collection of
3-digit SIC codes. Chemicals, petroleum and coal products and Metal and metal products
are two industry-groups that stand out for the high incidence of collusion in them. Leather
products and instruments are industry-groups with no collusive industries. Descriptive
statistics for the entire sample and separately for collusive and non-collusive industries are
given in Table 3.2.
3.5.5 Empirical Model
The empirical model used in the paper to examine the eﬀect of the industry vari-
ables described above on the incidence of explicit price-fixing across the U.S. manufacturing
sector, is a probit model with the following basic specification
COLL∗i = αi + β1GDi + β3LNCAPINTi + β4PDi (3.5)
+β5ADi + β6CADi + β7CONCi + β8CONC
2
i + ui
where instead of the “propensity to collude” COLL∗ an unobserved latent vari-
able, we observe the dichotomous variable COLL which takes the value 0 for non-collusive
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industries and 1 for collusive industries.
3.5.6 Potential Endogeneity
One possible problem with the above specification is that some variables on the
right hand side may be endogenous. In particular, a two-way link between market growth
and collusion; and advertising intensity and collusion cannot, in principle, be ruled out.
With firms colluding on a higher price, industry growth can be expected to be lower than
under a regime of price competition. Also, under price collusion, with collusion resulting
in higher prices than those that would prevail under competition, each firm’s incentive to
advertise would be higher. Thus advertising intensity is likely to be higher under price
collusion than under price competition.
The problem of possible endogeneity of the market growth variable is taken care
of by using lagged values. For instance, market growth for the census year 1987 is measured
as the growth in value of shipments between 1982 and 1987 minus the rate of inflation in
the same period.
The potential endogeneity of advertising cannot be solved by using lagged values
since data for advertising is not available for the earlier census years (which is the reason
that the sample is restricted to the three census years in the first place). This problem is of
particular concern as the criterion used to identify industries with dominant market-stealing
advertising rely on observed industry advertising. If the latter were indeed endogenous then
the veracity of any empirical results would be called into question.
To test whether advertising is in fact endogenous to the model I adopt a simple
test of exogeneity for limited dependent variable models suggested by Smith and Blundell
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(1986). The test involves specifying that the exogeneity of one or more explanatory variables
is under suspicion. This test is related to the Davidson-MacKinnon auxiliary regression
test for exogeneity in a regression context, which in turn is a convenient alternative to the
commonly employed Hausman test. Under the null hypothesis, all explanatory variables
are exogenous in the following empirical model which is essentially similar to the one in
Symeonidis (2003) and serves as a baseline model here
COLL∗i = αi + β1GROWTHi + β2LNCAPINTi (3.6)
+β3ADINTi + β4CONCi + β5CONC
2
i + ui
Under the alternative hypothesis, the suspected endogenous variable, advertising
intensity as measured by ADINT is expressed as a linear projection of a set of instruments
in the following first stage regression model22.
ADINTi = αi + β1GROWTHi + β2LAMi + β3PDi + β4CONCi + ei (3.7)
where LAMi is the lagged value of the average mark-up23 in industry i.
The results of the Smith-Blundell test along with the estimation results of the
baseline model in eq.(3.6) are given in Table 3.3. Given the p-values for the Smith-Blundell
exogeneity test null of exogeneity of advertising cannot be rejected .In all cases the p-values
are far from conventional significance levels.
22The first stage regression model is similar to the one in Strickland and Weiss (1976).
23The average mark-up in industry i is calculated as the ratio of value added minus the sum of capital
and wage expenditure in the industry to that of total value of sales.
76
For the test to be valid, the instruments for advertising intensity in eq. (3.7) have
to be exogenous to the model in eq.(3.6). It is for this reason that the average mark-up is
included with a lag24.
The fundamental premise of this paper is that observed industry characteristics
that contain information on underlying industry parameters aﬀect the (latent) propensity
to collude in an industry. The objective is to assess the impact of these variables on the
propensity to collude. It is important to note that the industry characteristics in turn, are
not aﬀected by the propensity to collude. For instance, while high market growth is believed
to facilitate collusion and thus should increase the propensity to collude in an industry, a
high propensity to collude will not aﬀect the market growth in the industry. It is only when
a high propensity to collude translates into actual collusion practiced by firms that market
growth in the industry will be aﬀected. This means that industry characteristics measured
at a point in time before collusion was actually practiced by firms, will be free from the
eﬀect of that collusion. This is despite the fact that the industry characteristics from the
earlier time period may cause the propensity to collude in the industry to be high. Thus,
the likelihood of lagged values of the industry characteristics being endogenous is low.
The records of the DOJ as summarized in the cases listed in the Trade Regulation
Reporter, contain information on the duration of the alleged price-fixing conspiracy with
a beginning and an end date (this information is in terms of the year and in some cases
the month as well). For many cases the end date of the conspiracy precedes the date when
the DOJ investigation was initiated while for others the two dates coincide. Recall from
24Note also that the way the market growth is calculated for an industry means that lagged values of the
growth rate are being used in all estimation equations.
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section 3.4.1 on data set construction, that an industry classified as collusive was paired
with the earliest census year possible given the time period of the associated price-fixing
conspiracy. For example, the four-digit SIC industry Medicinals and Botanicals had two
constituents products, vitamins B3 and B4 (niacin and niacinamide) that were the subject
of a price-fixing conspiracy between 1992 and 1998. Information on this case was first filed
in September 1998 in the federal district court of Dallas. The Medicinal and Botanicals
industry (SIC code 2833) is thus classified as collusive and enters the sample paired with
the earliest possible census year, 1992. The lagged value of the average mark-up used in
eq.(3.7) for this industry is from the previous census year i.e. 1987. Even allowing for some
inaccuracy in the records of the DOJ regarding the price-fixing conspiracy actually having
started in 1992, using the lagged value of the average mark-up (from 1987) minimizes the
chances of this being endogenous.
Now, since each of the variables on the right hand side of eq.(3.7) can be taken as
exogenous to the model in eq.(3.6), each of them is uncorrelated with u in eq.(3.6). Thus,
ADINT will be uncorrelated with u as well if and only if e is uncorrelated with u. The
Smith-Blundell test of exogeneity, thus involves including the residuals from the first stage
estimation of eq.(3.7) as an additional regressor in the second stage estimation of eq.(3.6).
Under the null hypothesis of exogeneity, the first-stage residuals have no power at the second
stage. As mentioned above, given the results of the test the null of exogeneity of advertising
cannot be rejected.
A possible reason behind the Smith-Blundell test result is as follows. Recall again
from Section 3.4.1 that an industry is classified as collusive, if even one of the many products
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constituting that industry has been subject to a price-fixing conspiracy. In the majority
of the industries thus classified, there is a single such product which has been subject to
a price-fixing conspiracy. Collusion in eﬀect, is determined and measured at the product
level. Evidence of price fixing at the product level is used to classify the associated indus-
try as collusive. Typically the weight of such products, in terms of the fraction of total
industry sales is around 10%. On the other hand, all the variables used in the estimation
equation, including market growth and advertising intensity, are measured at the industry
level and are thus determined by all products constituting that industry, not just the col-
lusive product25. Any link between variables measured at the industry level and collusion
at the product level, is likely to run from the former to the latter. As Symeonidis (2003)
argues advertising intensity in an industry is determined primarily by exogenous industry
characteristics. These may be inherent industry characteristics that determine advertising
eﬀectiveness or others such as government regulations26.
3.6 Results and Interpretation
The marginal eﬀects from the estimation of diﬀerent specifications of the basic
probit model in eq.(3.5) are reported in Tables 3.5 through ??. The specifications diﬀer
from each other in the use of diﬀerent measures of market-stealing advertising that are
25Admittedly, this is less than perfect for measuring the impact of factors like market growth and adver-
tising intensity on the incidence of collusion. Detailed data on these variables at the product level would be
much better suited for the purpose at hand. However, data is available only at the more aggregated level of
industries rather than products.
26For instance, until recently, the Food and Drug Administration required drug manufacturerers to an-
nounce all possible side-eﬀects in any television advertisement for any drug so advertised. This made
television advertising in the pharmaceutical industry prohibitively expensive. However, a change in the
stipulation now allows the manufacturers to list all these side-eﬀects briefly at the end of the advertisement.
The change in regulation has thus made television a viable medium for advertisement in the pharmaceutical
industry and can be thought of as increasing the eﬀectiveness of advertising in that industry.
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defined above, and in the inclusion of controls for industry-group specific eﬀects. The
industry-groups used for this are those that are identified in Section 3.5.4. Controlling
for the industry-group helps in alleviating misspecification concerns that may arise due to
omitted variables or due to industry specific eﬀects27.
3.6.1 Advertising
The results strongly suggest that collusion is less likely in industries with low
growth and high advertising. This is borne out by the negative and significant marginal
eﬀect of the market-staling advertising dummyMSAD1 as reported in Table 3.4. Moreover,
this result is robust to the inclusion of industry-group fixed eﬀects. The variable MSAD1
takes the value 1 for industries with lower than median growth and higher than median
advertising intensity, i.e. for those industries where market-stealing advertising is likely to
be dominant. An industry thus classified as having dominant market-stealing advertising,
has a probability of collusion that is lower by 10-15% points (as calculated at the sample
means).
The above eﬀect is reaﬃrmed in the alternate specification that uses a continuous
measure of dominant market-stealing advertisingMSA1 whose results are reported in Table
3.5. Recall that MSA1 is the interaction of advertising intensity and the inverse of the
market growth in an industry. Higher values of MSA1 imply high advertising coupled with
lower growth, i.e. precisely the scenario when market-stealing advertising is more likely to
be dominant. The marginal eﬀect of MSA1 is negative and significant for all specifications
27The coeﬃcients for the industry-group dummies are usually jointly significant at the 5% or the 10%
level.
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including fixed eﬀects probit as shown in Table 3.5. A unit increase in dominant market-
stealing advertising, as measured by MSA1, reduces the probability of collusion by 50-63%
points (at the sample means).
Collusion also seems less likely in consumer goods industries with high advertising
as the negative and significant marginal eﬀect of MSAD2 reported in Table 3.6 shows.
Once again, this result is robust to the inclusion of industry-group fixed eﬀects. The variable
MSAD2 takes the value 1 for those industries that are consumer-goods industries (for whom
PD = 1) with advertising intensity higher than the median. Consumer-goods industries are
believed to have a higher level of product diﬀerentiation and advertising is more likely to be
market-stealing in product diﬀerentiated industries than relatively homogeneous product
industries. When advertising is high in such industries, the market-stealing eﬀect is likely
to be dominant. Thus, the above industries are likely to be those with dominant market-
stealing advertising. An industry thus classified as having market-stealing advertising, has
a probability of collusion that is lower by 9-11% points (calculated at the sample means).
There is little clear evidence regarding the eﬀect of advertising in general (i.e.
when advertising is market-expanding or the market-stealing eﬀect is not dominant) on the
likelihood of collusion. The marginal eﬀect of the high advertising dummy AD is usually
insignificant. The exception is in the specification with MSAD2, where the marginal eﬀect
of AD is negative and significant. However, this result is not robust to the inclusion of
industry-fixed eﬀects as can be seen in Table 3.6. On the other hand, the marginal eﬀect
of advertising intensity ADINT is positive and always significant.
These results taken together provide strong evidence in support of the theoretical
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result obtained earlier that advertising can break down price collusion only when it is
market-stealing and the market-stealing eﬀect is dominant. Advertising that is not market-
stealing should prove no hindrance in price collusion. The reason for this result is as
follows. Under price collusion, the resulting higher price increases each firm’s incentive to
advertise as each firm’s private marginal return from a unit of advertising is higher. Thus,
under price collusion advertising competition is intensified. If advertising in the particular
industry is market-expanding, higher advertising by each firm exerts a positive externality
on the other firm and each firm’s profits are higher not only due to the higher collusive price
but also from the resulting higher advertising. However, when advertising in the industry
is market-stealing the intensified competition in advertising has an adverse impact on each
firm’s demand and thus profit. With dominant market-stealing advertising, the intensified
advertising competition may oﬀset all the gains from price collusion and thus break down
collusion.
This eﬀect of advertising on the likelihood of collusion has not been documented in
the empirical literature before. Previous empirical research in the area, has focused on the
eﬀect of advertising eﬀectiveness, as measured by advertising intensity, on the incidence of
collusion across industries. For instance, Symeonidis (2003) incorporates advertising in the
regression as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when advertising intensity is greater
than one percent. He finds that the incidence of price collusion is lower in advertising-
intensive industries and interprets this finding as high advertising eﬀectiveness reducing the
likelihood of collusion. However,as the theoretical model outlined in this paper shows, high
advertising eﬀectiveness (in terms of a high private benefit to advertising) is not suﬃcient
82
to break down collusion. It is advertising combativeness not eﬀectiveness that can break
down collusion and the estimation results reported in the paper lend strong support to this
hypothesis.
However, it is not diﬃcult to reconcile the result in Symeonidis (2003) with those
obtained in this paper. First, the possibility of the results for advertising intensity in Syme-
onidis (2003) being aﬀected by measurement error cannot be ruled out28. As is outlined in
his paper, Symeonidis (2003) has collected data on advertising from various diﬀerent sources
at levels of aggregation diﬀerent from the four-digit industry level used in the empirical es-
timation29. Second, it is possible, especially in light of the possibility of measurement
error highlighted above, that the industries that are classified as advertising-intensive are
also industries with market-stealing advertising. The source of advertising data used by
Symeonidis (2003) is Statistical Review of Press and TV Advertising which reports data
on advertising primarily for consumer-goods industries. Other industries for which data is
not available have been classified as low-advertising industries by Symeonidis (2003). Thus,
the eﬀect that Symeonidis (2003) is capturing is that of high advertising in consumer-goods
industries on the likelihood of price collusion which he finds to be negative and ascribes
to advertising in general. But this is precisely the result that is obtained in this paper as
borne out by the negative and significant marginal eﬀect of MSAD2. To the extent that
consumer-goods industries are also product-diﬀerentiated industries and advertising is more
28The possibility of measurement error is common in other studies that use advertising data. For eg. Asch
and Seneca use advertising data at the minor industry group level as reported by the Income Tax Source
Book published by the IRS and use it draw inferences on the incidence of collusion at the industry level.
Minor industry groups usually comprise 5-10 industries.
29This is the reason Symeonidis uses a dummy variable to classify advertising intensive industries. He ar-
gues that industries (primarily non consumer-goods industries) for which data on advertising is not available
are low-advertising industries.
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market-stealing in product-diﬀerentiated industries, the market-stealing eﬀect is likely to
be dominant in consumer-goods industries with high advertising. Thus the finding in Syme-
onidis (2003) that the incidence of collusion is lower in advertising-intensive industries can
actually be interpreted as the incidence of collusion being lower in industries with dominant
market-stealing advertising.
To further test the validity of the results obtained in this paper, I divide the entire
sample of industries into two sub-samples: high-growth and low-growth industries. The first
sub-sample includes industries with growth rates higher than the median of the entire sample
while the opposite is true of the second sub-sample. I estimate a probit model which diﬀers
with the original specification in the exclusion of the dominant market-stealing advertising
term. If advertising is indeed more market-stealing in slow growth industries than in high
growth industries, and market-stealing advertising reduces the likelihood of collusion (when
advertising is high such that the market-stealing eﬀect becomes dominant) then this would
result in a negative and significant marginal eﬀect of advertising intensity (ADINT ) for
the low-growth sub-sample but not for the high-growth one. In fact this is exactly the
case as is shown in Table 3.7 and Table ??. The marginal eﬀect of ADINT is negative
and significant for low-growth industries but not for high-growth industries. In low growth
industries advertising is more market-stealing and high advertising in such industries makes
the market-stealing eﬀect dominant. Thus in these industries, high advertising intensity
reduces the likelihood of collusion.
Dividing the entire sample into low-growth and high-growth industries also allows
to test for the possibility of an entry-barrier eﬀect of advertising. Firms can try to use
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advertising to create brand loyalty to tie in consumers. This increases the cost of entering a
market for prospective entrants and thus acts as an entry barrier. By reducing the likelihood
of future entry of new firms advertising can increase the likelihood of price collusion. The
lower prospects of future entry mean that the collusive profits are shared amongst fewer
firms and these are less likely to be eroded in the future through new entrants. This reduces
the incentive for a firm in a collusive agreement to deviate from that agreement. Second,
by reducing entry, advertising keeps the number of firms in the market down and known
which makes collusion easier to monitor.
However, if advertising acts as a barrier to entry it should have a positive eﬀect
on the likelihood of collusion especially amongst high-growth industries. This is because
the threat of entry is higher in faster growing industries and firms are more likely to use
advertising as an entry barrier precisely in such industries. As the results in Table 3.7 and
Table ?? show this is clearly not the case. Advertising has an insignificant marginal eﬀect
on the likelihood of collusion in the high-growth industries.
3.6.2 Other Industry Variables
The estimation results suggest a positive relation between market growth and the
likelihood of collusion, with low market growth being associated with a lower probability of
collusion. This is borne out by the negative and significant marginal eﬀect of the low growth
dummy GD as reported in Table 3.4 and Table 3.6. According to these results an industry
with low market growth has a probability of collusion that is lower by 13-21% points (at
the sample means). This positive link is reaﬃrmed by the negative and significant marginal
eﬀect of the inverse of market growth INV GROWTH as reported in Table 3.6. Lower
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market growth makes it more diﬃcult for firms to sustain collusion. With lower market
growth, firms value future profits from collusion less which increases the attractiveness of
deviating from collusion in the present.
The regression results strongly suggest that incidence of collusion is higher in
industries with high capital intensity. The marginal eﬀect of both measures of capital
intensity LNCAPINT1 and LNCAPINT2 are always positive and significant30. Two
reasons, one relating to barriers to entry and the other to the monitoring of collusion help
in explaining this result. The importance of sunk costs, that are implied by high capital
intensity, reduce the extent of entry in an industry. Lower entry implies that the gains from
collusion for firms are unlikely to be eliminated in the future due to increased competitive
pressure from new firms. This strengthens the incentive for collusion.
There is no clear evidence, either way, of any link between industry concentration
and the incidence of collusion. The marginal eﬀect of CONC is negative but not significant.
High concentration may have two opposing eﬀects on the likelihood of collusion. On the
one hand, high concentration increases each firm’s share of collusive profits and makes
monitoring easier. On the other hand, high industry concentration may be associated with
the presence of dominant firms and significant firm asymmetries. This may make collusion
more unlikely in any given industry. High industry concentration could eliminate the need
for explicit price collusion as tacit collusion becomes easy to enforce when the number of
firms is small.
There is no evidence on the eﬀect of product diﬀerentiation on collusion either.
30Capital intensity as a level term (instead of in logs) was also tried in other specifications, the results of
which are not reported here. The results were similar.
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The coeﬃcient on PD is always insignificant. Martin (2001) presents theoretical models of
cartel stability under horizontal product diﬀerentiation that yield ambiguous results. Under
product diﬀerentiation markets are relatively more atomistic. If buyers’ markets for goods
are relatively atomistic price cuts to individual buyers would be relatively unprofitable, the
incentive to deviate from a collusive agreement for a firm would be weaker and thus, the
prospects for collusion would be enhanced.
The estimation results for the alternative measure of product diﬀerentiation TOID
that is constructed from the trade overlap index, and the associated index of market-stealing
advertising are not reported as they are not found to be significant. A possible reason for
this is that the for the trade overlap index to be used as a proxy for product diﬀerentiation
it should ideally be calculated at the product level. Calculating the trade overlap index at
the industry level may add too much noise for it to be an accurate measure of the level of
product diﬀerentiation in an industry thereby leading to statistically insignificant results.
However, future studies should consider the trade overlap index as an alternative measure
of product diﬀerentiation when using data at the product level.
3.7 Conclusion
The paper examines the eﬀect of advertising on price collusion using an original
data set constructed from summaries of price-fixing cases across the manufacturing sector
in the United States. The theoretical model outlined in the paper shows that this eﬀect of
advertising on collusion depends on whether advertising in an industry is market-stealing
or market-expanding. Advertising could hinder price collusion when it is market-stealing
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(and this eﬀect is dominant) but not when it is market-expanding.
Two types of industries are identified where the market-stealing eﬀect of advertis-
ing is likely to be dominant. In industries with low market growth, advertising is more likely
to be market-stealing than market-expanding. In addition, advertising in industries with
a higher level of product-diﬀerentiation is more likely to be market-stealing. Furthermore,
when the above industries also have high advertising, the market-stealing eﬀect is likely to
be dominant.
The econometric results presented in the paper support the predictions of the
theory. Collusion is found to be less likely in industries with low market growth and high
advertising. Furthermore, the incidence of collusion is also found to be lower in product-
diﬀerentiated industries with high advertising. This is the first paper to document these
eﬀects of advertising on price collusion.
The paper also finds a positive relationship between market growth and price
collusion. In addition, collusion is found to be more likely in industries with a higher
capital intensity. These results have been previously documented for the United Kingdom
in the 1950s. However, this is the first paper to use U.S. antitrust data to systematically
study the factors that aﬀect collusion across manufacturing industries.
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Table 3.1: Distribution of Manufacturing Industries  
 
 Number of Four Digit Industries 
Industry Group Collusive Noncollusive 
Food, drink and tobacco 
 
4 35 
Textiles and apparel 
 
3 45 
Lumber, furniture, etc 
 
4 18 
Paper, printing and publishing 
 
3 7 
Chemicals, petroleum and coal 
products 
13 14 
Rubber and plastic products 
 
3 5 
Leather products 
 
0 11 
Stone, clay and glass 
 
8 17 
Metal and metal products 
 
15 22 
Industrial machinery 
 
4 36 
Electric and electronic 
products 
 
6 19 
Transportation equipment 
 
1 13 
Instruments 
 
0 16 
Miscellaneous 
 
1 14 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics  
  Collusive Noncollusive All 
  N=65 N=272 N=337 
GROWTH Mean 1.18 1.02 1.06 
 Std. Deviation 0.24 0.26 0.27 
CAPINT1 Mean 12214.27 7950.65 8721.18 
 Std. Deviation 22310.46 20434.59 20815.94 
CAPINT2 Mean 4.41 3.05 3.31 
 Std. Deviation 2.62 1.85 2.08 
ADINT Mean 0.31 0.42 0.40 
 Std. Deviation 0.45 0.57 0.55 
F4 Mean 33.07 41.26 39.65 
 Std. Deviation 18.65 21.29 21.01 
F8 Mean 46.53 54.11 52.61 
 Std. Deviation 21.66 23.09 22.97 
HHI Mean 581.45 741.64 709.70 
 Std. Deviation 575.88 670.03 654.52 
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Table 3.3: Smith Blundell Test Of Exogeneity 
Dependent Variable COLLUSION=1 for collusive industries, 0 for noncollusive 
337 Observations 
 (1) (2) 
Growth Rate 
(GROWTH) 
 
0.29*** 
(0.08) 
0.27*** 
(0.07) 
Advertising Intensity 
(ADINT) 
 
-0.07* 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
Log of Capital Intensity 1  
(LNCAPINT1= Log of Total Assets-Log of Number 
of Establishments ) 
 
0.06*** 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
Four Firm Concentration Ratio 
(CONC) 
 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.0001 
(0.003) 
Four Firm Concentration Ratio2 
(CONC2) 
 
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.0004 
(0.0004) 
Industry Group Dummies in First Stage Equation 
 
Yes Yes 
Industry Group Dummies in Second Stage Equation 
 
No Yes 
Smith-Blundell Test Statistic 
(Probability>χ2) 
 
0.005 
(0.94) 
0.41 
(0.52) 
Note: ***  significant at 1% 
          **    significant at 5% 
          *      significant at 10% 
          Standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 3.4:Probit Estimation Marginal Effects 
Dependent Variable COLLUSION=1 for collusive industries, 0 for noncollusive 
337 Observations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Low Growth Dummy 
(GD) 
 
-0.12** 
(0.05) 
-0.13*** 
(0.05) 
-0.11** 
(0.05) 
-0.13*** 
(0.05) 
High Advertising Dummy 
(AD) 
 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
Dominant Market-Stealing Advertising Dummy 1 
(MSAD1=High Advertising Dummy*Low Growth 
Dummy) 
 
-0.14*** 
(0.04) 
-0.10*** 
(0.04) 
-0.13*** 
(0.05) 
-0.10*** 
(0.04) 
Log of Capital Intensity 1  
(LNCAPINT1= Log of Total Assets-Log of Number 
of Establishments ) 
 
0.05*** 
(0.02) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
 
- 
 
- 
Log of Capital Intensity 2  
(LNCAPINT2= Log of Total Capital Expenditure-
Log of Total Sales) 
 
 
- 
 
- 
0.15*** 
(0.04) 
0.10** 
(0.03) 
Four Firm Concentration Ratio 
(CONC) 
 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.0002 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
Four Firm Concentration Ratio2 
(CONC2) 
 
-0.00002 
(0.00004) 
-0.00003 
(0.00003) 
-0.00003 
(0.00004) 
-0.00003 
(0.00003) 
Industry Group Dummies 
 
 
No Yes No Yes 
 
Year Dummies 
 
No Yes No Yes 
 
Pseudo R2 
 
 
0.1879 0.3154 0.2226 0.3319 
 
Note: ***  significant at 1% 
          **    significant at 5% 
          *      significant at 10% 
          Standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 3.5: Probit Estimation Marginal Effects 
Dependent Variable COLLUSION=1 for collusive industries, 0 for noncollusive 
337 Observations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Inverse Growth 
(INVGRTH) 
 
-0.18* 
(0.11) 
-0.19** 
(0.10) 
-0.18 
(0.11) 
-0.18* 
(0.10) 
Advertising Intensity 
(ADINT) 
0.46** 
(0.20) 
0.39** 
(0.18) 
0.41** 
(0.21) 
0.36* 
(0.18) 
Dominant Market-Stealing Advertising 
(MSA1=Advertising Intensity* Inverse Growth) 
 
-0.63*** 
(0.23) 
-0.52** 
(0.21) 
-0.58** 
(0.25) 
-0.50** 
(0.22) 
Log of Capital Intensity 1  
(LNCAPINT1= Log of Total Assets-Log of Number 
of Establishments ) 
 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
 
- 
 
- 
Log of Capital Intensity 2 
(LNCAPINT2= Log of Total Capital Expenditure-
Log of Total Sales) 
 
 
- 
 
- 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
Four Firm Concentration Ratio 
(CONC) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.0001 
(0.003) 
-0.0003 
(0.003) 
-0.0005 
(0.003) 
Four Firm Concentration Ratio2 
(CONC2) 
-0.00002 
(0.00004) 
-0.00002 
(0.00003) 
-0.00004 
(0.00004) 
-0.00002 
(0.00004) 
Industry Group Dummies No Yes No Yes 
 
Year Dummies No Yes No Yes 
 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.1615 0.2790 0.1936 0.2961 
 
Note: ***  significant at 1% 
          **    significant at 5% 
          *      significant at 10% 
          Standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 3.6: Probit Estimation Marginal Effects 
Dependent Variable COLLUSION=1 for collusive industries, 0 for noncollusive 
337 Observations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Low Growth Dummy 
(GD) 
 
-0.19*** 
(0.04) 
-0.19*** 
(0.04) 
-0.18*** 
(0.04) 
-0.18*** 
(0.04) 
High Advertising Dummy 
(AD) 
 
-0.08* 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.08* 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
Consumer Goods Dummy 
(PD) 
-0.05 
(0.09) 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.07) 
Dominant Market-Stealing Advertising Dummy 2 
(MSAD2=High Advertising Dummy*Consumer 
Goods Dummy) 
 
-0.11** 
(0.05) 
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
-0.10* 
(0.05) 
-0.10*** 
(0.03) 
Log of Capital Intensity 1  
(LNCAPINT1= Log of Total Assets-Log of 
Number of Establishments ) 
 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
 
- 
 
- 
Log of Capital Intensity 2 
(LNCAPINT2= Log of Total Capital 
Expenditure-Log of Total Sales) 
 
 
- 
 
- 
0.16*** 
(0.04) 
0.09*** 
(0.04) 
Four Firm Concentration Ratio 
(CONC) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.0003 
(0.003) 
-0.0005 
(0.004) 
-0.0005 
(0.003) 
Four Firm Concentration Ratio2 
(CONC2) 
-0.00004 
(0.00004) 
-0.00004 
(0.00003) 
-0.00004 
(0.00004) 
-0.00003 
(0.00004) 
Industry Group Dummies No Yes No Yes 
 
Year Dummies No Yes No Yes 
 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.1788 0.3164 0.2198 0.3361 
 
Note: ***  significant at 1% 
          **    significant at 5% 
          *      significant at 10% 
          Standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 3.7: Probit Estimation Marginal Effects 
Dependent variable COLL =1 for collusive industries, 0 for noncollusive 
 All Industries:337 Low Growth 
Industries: 169 
High Growth 
Industries: 168 
Growth Rate 
(GROWTH) 
 
0.30*** 
(0.08) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
0.003 
(0.18) 
Advertising Intensity 
(ADINT) 
 
-0.07* 
(0.04) 
-0.13*** 
(0.05) 
-0.05 
(0.08) 
Log of Capital Intensity 1  
(LNCAPINT1= Log of Total Assets-Log of 
Number of Establishments ) 
 
0.06*** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
Four Firm Concentration Ratio 
(CONC) 
 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
Four Firm Concentration Ratio2 
(CONC2) 
 
-0.00004 
(0.00004) 
-0.00002 
(0.00003) 
-0.00004 
(0.00008) 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.1295 0.1573 0.0792 
Note: ***  significant at 1% 
          **    significant at 5% 
          *      significant at 10% 
          Standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 3.8: Probit Estimation Marginal Effects 
Dependent variable COLL =1 for collusive industries, 0 for noncollusive 
 All Industries:337 Low Growth 
Industries: 169 
High Growth 
Industries: 168 
Growth Rate 
(GROWTH) 
 
0.25*** 
(0.08) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
0.004 
(0.18) 
Advertising Intensity 
(ADINT) 
 
-0.07* 
(0.04) 
-0.13*** 
(0.05) 
-0.05 
(0.07) 
Log of Capital Intensity 2 
(LNCAPINT2=Log of Total Capital 
Expenditure-Log of Sales) 
 
0.18*** 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.33*** 
(0.08) 
Four Firm Concentration Ratio 
(CONC) 
 
-0.0001 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
Four Firm Concentration Ratio2 
(CONC2) 
 
-0.00004 
(0.00005) 
-0.00002 
(0.00003) 
-0.00005 
(0.00009) 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.1667 0.1576 0.1298 
Note: ***  significant at 1% 
          **    significant at 5% 
          *      significant at 10% 
          Standard errors in parenthesis 
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Derivation of demand functions
The representative consumer maximizes
u (q1, q2)−
2X
i=1
piqi (A.1)
where
u (q1, q2) =
2X
i=1
[σ + (ε+ τ)Φi − (ψ − τ)Φj 6=i] qi −
1
2
¡
ωq21 + 2χq1q2 + ωq
2
2
¢
Maximizing the expression in A.1 with respect to q1 and q2 gives the following two
first order conditions
σ + (ε+ τ)Φ1 − (ψ − τ)Φ2 − ωq1 − χq2 − p1 = 0 (A.2)
and
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σ + (ε+ τ)Φ2 − (ψ − τ)Φ1 − ωq2 − χq1 − p1 = 0 (A.3)
Solving the two simultaneous equations for q1 and q2 I get the demand functions
of the two firms
D1 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α− βp1 + δp2 + γΦ1 − λΦ2
and
D2 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α− βp2 + δp1 + γΦ2 − λΦ1
where,
α =
σ
ω + χ
β =
ω
ω2 − χ2
δ =
χ
ω2 − χ2
γ =
ε+ τ
ω + χ
λ =
ψ − τ
ω + χ
Since I assume ω > χ, it follows that β > δ.
A.2 Proofs
A.2.1 Proposition 1
The competitive equilibrium price in eq.2.7 can be written as
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1
(2β − δ)
·
α+
αγ (γ − λ)
a (2β − δ)− γ (γ − λ)
¸
and that under price semicollusion in eq.2.9 as
1
2 (β − δ)
·
α+
αγ (γ − λ)
2a (β − δ)− γ (γ − λ)
¸
Since β > δ, it has to be true that (2β − δ) > 2 (β − δ) and therefore, a (2β − δ) >
2aβ − δ). Also since (2β − δ) > 2 (β − δ), 1(2β−δ) <
1
2(β−δ) and therefore,
A > B
Where,
A ≡ 1
2 (β − δ)
·
α+
αγ (γ − λ)
2a (β − δ)− γ (γ − λ)
¸
B ≡ 1
(2β − δ)
·
α+
αγ (γ − λ)
a (2β − δ)− γ (γ − λ)
¸
A.2.2 Lemma 1
The expressions for the profit of each firm under competition (πn) and that under
price semicollusion (πpc) are:
πn =
aα2
¡
2aβ − γ2
¢
2 [a (2β − δ)− γ (γ + λ)]2
(A.4)
and
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πpc =
aα2
£
2a (β − δ)− γ2
¤
2 [2a (β − δ)− γ (γ + λ)]2
(A.5)
Once again, I restrict attention to the case where the profit of each firm under
price semicollusion is positive. I therefore make the following assumption that guarantees
positive profits for firms under price semicollusion:
• Assumption 1: 2a (β − δ)− γ (γ + λ) > 0.1
For given values of the parameters a, α, β and δ, and using the above expressions
for πn and πpc in eq.A.7 and A.8 definition 3 I get the expression of G (γ, λ):
G (γ, λ) =
a2α2δ
2
"
aδ
£
2a (β − δ)− γ2
¤
+ 2γλ [2a (β − δ)− γ (γ + λ)]
[2a (β − δ)− γ (γ + λ)]2 [a (2β − δ)− γ (γ + λ)]2
#
(A.6)
Using assumption 1 that guarantees positive profits for firms under price semicol-
lusion it is clear that G (γ, λ) > 0 which gives the result stated in the text..
A.2.3 Lemma 2
The expressions for the profit of each firm under competition (πn) and that under
price semicollusion (πpc) are:
πn =
aα2
¡
2aβ − γ2
¢
2 [a (2β − δ)− γ (γ − λ)]2
(A.7)
and
1This assumption is also suﬃcient (though not necessary) for the profit of each firm under the competitive
equilibrium (πn) to be positive.
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πpc =
aα2
£
2a (β − δ)− γ2
¤
2 [2a (β − δ)− γ (γ − λ)]2
(A.8)
I restrict attention to the case where the profit of each firm under price semicollu-
sion is positive. I therefore make the following assumption that guarantees positive profits
for firms under price semicollusion:
• Assumption 2: 2a (β − δ)− γ2 > 0.2
For given values of the parameters a, α, β and δ, and using the above expressions
for πn and πpc in eq.A.7 and A.8 definition 4 I get the expression of F (γ, λ):
F (γ, λ) =
a2α2δ
2
"
aδ
£
2a (β − δ)− γ2
¤
− 2γλ [2a (β − δ)− γ (γ − λ)]
[2a (β − δ)− γ (γ − λ)]2 [a (2β − δ)− γ (γ − λ)]2
#
(A.9)
As stated in the text using the implicit function theorem F (γ, λ) = 0 defines an
implicit function λ = f (γ). The equation F (γ, λ) = 0 has the status of an identity in the
neighborhood in which it is defined, therefore,
dF (γ, λ) = d0
⇒
Fγdγ + Fλdλ = 0
⇒
2This assumption is also suﬃcient (though not necessary) for the profit of each firm under the competitive
equilibrium (πn) to be positive.
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dλ
dγ
= −Fγ
Fλ
(A.10)
Since λ = f (γ) is defined by F (γ, λ) = 0, dλdγ in eq.A.10 gives the slope of this
function.
Now, using eq. A.9 the implicit function λ = f (γ) is given by
aδ
£
2a (β − δ)− γ2
¤
− 2γλ [2a (β − δ)− γ (γ − λ)] = 0 (A.11)
Taking the total derivative of eq.A.11 and simplifying I get
dλ
dγ
= −
2λ
£
2a (β − δ)− γ2
¤
+ 2γ [aδ − 2γλ] + 4γλ2
2γ [2a (β − δ)− γ2] + 4γ2λ (A.12)
Since I’m considering the case where the profit of each firm price semicollusion
(πpc) is positive, its has to be true that 2a (β − δ) − γ2 > 0 (from assumption 2) and
therefore the denominator of the term on the R.H.S. of eq.A.12 is positive.
2γ
£
2a (β − δ)− γ2
¤
+ 4γ2λ > 0 (A.13)
From eq.A.11:
aδ
2γλ
=
2a (β − δ)− γ(γ − λ)
2a (β − δ)− γ2
⇒
aδ
2γλ
=
2a (β − δ)− γ2 + γλ
2a (β − δ)− γ2
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⇒
aδ
2γλ
> 1 (A.14)
Once again using assumption 1 along with eq.A.14, the numerator of the term on
the R.H.S. of eq.A.12 has to be positive, i.e.
2λ
£
2a (β − δ)− γ2
¤
+ 2γ (aδ − 2γλ) + 4γλ2 > 0 (A.15)
Combining eq.A.15 and eq.A.13 I get the result dλdγ < 0.
A.2.4 Lemma 3
Since λ = f (γ) is the implicit function defined by F (γ, λ) = 0 and λ∗ = f (γ∗) it
follows that F (γ∗, λ∗) = 0. Thus, from eq.A.9:
a2α2δ
2
"
aδ
£
2a (β − δ)− γ∗2
¤
− 2γ∗λ∗ [2a (β − δ)− γ∗ (γ∗ − λ∗)]
[2a (β − δ)− γ∗ (γ∗ − λ∗)]2 [a (2β − δ)− γ∗ (γ∗ − λ∗)]2
#
= 0 (A.16)
Since I assume 2a (β − δ) − γ2 > 0 to guarantee that the profits under price
semicollusion are positive, the denominator of the term on the left hand side of eq.A.16 is
always strictly positive. Therefore eq.A.16 implies:
aδ
£
2a (β − δ)− γ∗2
¤
− 2γ∗λ∗ [2a (β − δ)− γ∗ (γ∗ − λ∗)] = 0
⇒
aδ
2γ∗λ∗
=
2a (β − δ)− γ∗(γ∗ − λ∗)
2a (β − δ)− γ∗2
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⇒
aδ
2γ∗λ∗
=
2a (β − δ)− γ∗2 + γ∗λ∗
2a (β − δ)− γ∗2 (A.17)
Now consider λ0 < λ∗, the following has to be true
aδ
2γ∗λ0
>
aδ
2γ∗λ∗
(A.18)
Next, I take the partial derivative of 2a(β−δ)−γ
2+γλ
2a(β−δ)−γ2 with respect to λ.
∂
∂λ
·
2a (β − δ)− γ2 + γλ
2a (β − δ)− γ2
¸
=
γ
[2a (β − δ)− γ2]2
> 0
Thus, 2aδ−γ
2+γλ
2aδ−γ2 is increasing in λ. Since λ
0 < λ∗ and 2a(β−δ)−γ
2+γλ
2a(β−δ)−γ2 is increasing
in λ
2a (β − δ)− γ∗2 + γ∗λ∗
2a (β − δ)− γ∗2 >
2a (β − δ)− γ∗2 + γ∗λ0
2a (β − δ)− γ∗2 (A.19)
Using eq.A.17, eq.A.18 and eq.A.19 I get
aδ
2γ∗λ0
>
2a (β − δ)− γ∗2 + γ∗λ0
2a (β − δ)− γ∗2
⇒
aδ
£
2a (β − δ)− γ∗2
¤
− 2γ∗λ0
£
2a (β − δ)− γ∗
¡
γ∗ − λ0
¢¤
> 0 (A.20)
Once again, since I assume 2a (β − δ) − γ2 > 0 for all values of γ, to guarantee
positive profits under price semicollusion
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£
2a (β − δ)− γ∗
¡
γ∗ − λ0
¢¤2 £a (2β − δ)− γ∗ ¡γ∗ − λ0¢¤2 > 0 (A.21)
Dividing eq.A.20 by eq.A.21 and multiplying by a
2α2δ
2 I get
a2α2δ
2
"
aδ
£
2a (β − δ)− γ∗2
¤
− 2γ∗λ0
£
2a (β − δ)− γ∗
¡
γ∗ − λ0
¢¤£
2a (β − δ)− γ∗
¡
γ∗ − λ0
¢¤2 £a (2β − δ)− γ∗ ¡γ∗ − λ0¢¤2
#
> 0
⇒
F
¡
γ∗, λ0
¢
> 0
for any λ0 < λ∗, where λ∗ = f (γ∗). By analogous reasoning I can show that
F
¡
γ∗, λ0
¢
< 0
for any λ0 > λ∗, where λ∗ = f (γ∗).
A.2.5 Lemma 4 and Lemma 5
Since λ = f (γ) is defined by F (γ, λ) = 0, where F (γ, λ) is given by eq.A.11,
λ = f (γ) is given by
aδ
£
2a (β − δ)− γ2
¤
− 2γλ [2a (β − δ)− γ (γ − λ)] = 0
For any given value of γ and δ define λ1 = f1 (γ) such that λ1 = f1 (γ) is given by
a1δ
£
2a1 (β − δ)− γ2
¤
− 2γλ1 [2a1 (β − δ)− γ (γ − λ1)] = 0 (A.22)
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and define λ2 = f2 (γ) such that λ2 = f2 (γ) is given by
a2δ
£
2a2 (β − δ)− γ2
¤
− 2γλ2 [2a2 (β − δ)− γ (γ − λ2)] = 0 (A.23)
where a2 > a1.
Rearranging the terms in eq.sA.22 and A.23 respectively, I get
a1δ
2γλ1
=
2a1 (β − δ)− γ2 + γλ1
2a1 (β − δ)− γ2
(A.24)
and
a2δ
2γλ2
=
2a2 (β − δ)− γ2 + γλ2
2a2 (β − δ)− γ2
(A.25)
Since a2 > a1,
a2δ
2γλ1
>
a1δ
2γλ1
(A.26)
Now, 2a(β−δ)−γ
2+γλ
2a(β−δ)−γ2 is decreasing in a and a2 > a1, hence
2a1 (β − δ)− γ2 + γλ1
2a1 (β − δ)− γ2
>
2a2 (β − δ)− γ2 + γλ1
2a2 (β − δ)− γ2
(A.27)
Using eq.A.24, A.26 and A.27 I get
a2δ
2γλ1
>
2a2 (β − δ)− γ2 + γλ1
2a2 (β − δ)− γ2
(A.28)
Now let us assume that λ2 < λ1. Since
2a(β−δ)−γ2+γλ
2a(β−δ)−γ2 is increasing in λ it follows
that
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2a2 (β − δ)− γ2 + γλ1
2a2δ − γ2
>
2a2 (β − δ)− γ2 + γλ2
2a2δ − γ2
(A.29)
Using A.25, A.28 and A.29 I get
a2δ
2γλ1
>
a2δ
2γλ2
⇒
λ2 > λ1
which is a contradiction, since I assumed λ2 < λ1. Hence it has to be true that
λ2 > λ1 where λ1 and λ2 are as defined by eq.s A.22 and A.23 a2 > a1. The proof of Lemma
5 is analogous
A.2.6 Lemma 6 and Lemma 7
Since λ = f (γ) is defined by F (γ, λ) = 0, where F (γ, λ) is given by eq.A.11,
λ = f (γ) is given by
aδ
£
2a (β − δ)− γ2
¤
− 2γλ [2a (β − δ)− γ (γ − λ)] = 0
For any given value of γ and a define λ1 = f1 (γ) such that λ1 = f1 (γ) is given by
aδ1
£
2a (β − δ1)− γ2
¤
− 2γλ1 [2a (β − δ1)− γ (γ − λ1)] = 0 (A.30)
and define λ2 = f2 (γ) such that λ2 = f2 (γ) is given by
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aδ2
£
2a (β − δ2)− γ2
¤
− 2γλ2 [2a (β − δ2)− γ (γ − λ2)] = 0 (A.31)
where δ2 > δ1.
Rearranging the terms in eq.sA.30 and A.31 respectively, I get
aδ1
2γλ1
=
2a (β − δ1)− γ2 + γλ1
2a (β − δ1)− γ2
(A.32)
and
aδ2
2γλ2
=
2a (β − δ2)− γ2 + γλ2
2a (β − δ2)− γ2
(A.33)
Since δ2 > δ1,
aδ2
2γλ1
>
aδ2
2γλ1
(A.34)
Now, 2a(β−δ)−γ
2+γλ
2a(β−δ)−γ2 is decreasing in δ and δ2 > δ1, hence
2a (β − δ1)− γ2 + γλ1
2a (β − δ1)− γ2
>
2a (β − δ2)− γ2 + γλ1
2a (β − δ2)− γ2
(A.35)
Using eq.A.32, A.34 and A.35 I get
aδ2
2γλ1
>
2a (β − δ2)− γ2 + γλ1
2a (β − δ2)− γ2
(A.36)
Now let us assume that λ2 < λ1. Since
2a(β−δ)−γ2+γλ
2a(β−δ)−γ2 is increasing in λ it follows
that
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2a (β − δ2)− γ2 + γλ1
2aδ2 − γ2
>
2a (β − δ2)− γ2 + γλ2
2aδ2 − γ2
(A.37)
Using A.33, A.36 and A.37 I get
aδ2
2γλ1
>
aδ2
2γλ2
⇒
λ2 > λ1
which is a contradiction, since I assumed λ2 < λ1. Hence it has to be true that
λ2 > λ1 where λ1 and λ2 are as defined by eq.s A.22 and A.23 δ2 > δ1. The proof of Lemma
7 is analogous.
A.2.7 Price Comparison Across Regimes
In the regime where firms are not allowed to engage in advertising, the demand
curves facing firm 1 and firm 2 respectively, are given by
D1 (p1, p2) = α− βp1 + δp2
and
D2 (p1, p2) = α− βp2 + δp1
When the firms compete on price, firm 1’s behavior and firm 2’s behavior respec-
tively are described as
max {p1 (α− βp1 + δp2)}
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with respect to p1 and.
max {p2 (α− βp2 + δp1)}
with respect to p2.
The first order conditions yield the following best response function for firm 1 and
firm 2 respectively
p1 =
1
2β
(α+ δp2) (A.38)
and
p2 =
1
2β
(α+ δp1) (A.39)
Solving eq.A.38 and eq.A.39 simultaneously yields the following
pnna =
α
2β − δ (A.40)
where the superscript and the subscript denote that this is the competitive price (n for non-
collusive) under the regime where advertising by firms is prohibited (na for no advertising).
The profit of each firm when both firms compete on price in the regime without advertising
is given by
πnna =
βα2
(2β − δ)2
(A.41)
When firms collude on price, I impose the symmetry condition p1 = p2 = pcna in
each firm’s profit function. Each firm’s behavior is described as
110
max {p [α− (β − δ) p]}
with respect to p. This leads to the following solution for pcna, the price under
collusion in the regime without advertising
pcna =
α
2 (β − δ)
The profit of each firm when they collude on price in the regime without advertising
is thus, given by
πcna =
α2
4 (β − δ) (A.42)
Thus if the discount factor d is suﬃciently large, price collusion will constitute
a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game with repeated firm interaction, in the regime
where advertising by firms is prohibited. In such a case, consumers would face the non
collusive price pna in the regime with advertising and may/ are likely to face the collusive
price pcna in the regime without advertising. Using (2.14) and (2.16) from the text, one can
see that the latter will exceed the former when
α
2 (β − δ) >
aα
a (2β − δ)− γ (γ − λ)
⇒
aδ − γ (γ − λ) > 0
2 (β − δ) [a (2β − δ)− γ (γ − λ)] > 0 (A.43)
Recall that I assume 2a (β − δ)−γ2 > 0, thus the denominator of the term on the
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left hand side of the inequality above, a (2β − δ)− γ (γ − λ) > 0. Therefore (A.43) gives us
inequality(2.17) in the text
aδ − γ (γ − λ) > 0
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Informative Advertising
According to Tirole (1988), informative advertising is used by firms to convey
information to consumers. This information could be about the existence, price, quality or
attributes of the firm’s product.
B.1.1 Model
In this appendix I present a model of informative advertising. The purpose of
this is to show that the demand functions given by eq.(3.1) and eq.(3.2) do not necessarily
imply a persuasive role for advertising and are consistent with the possibility of advertising
being informative. Furthermore, the rationale that advertising in industries with a higher
degree of product diﬀerentiation is more likely to be market-stealing than in industries with
relatively homogeneous products can be applied to the case where advertising is informative.
The purpose behind presenting this model is purely illustrative.
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The basic setup of the model is similar to that in the chapter in that there is
an oligopolistic industry with two firms, each one producing a diﬀerentiated good, and a
competitive numeraire good producing industry. There is a continuum of identical con-
sumers, each with a utility function separable and linear in the numeraire good. The mass
of consumers is normalized to one without loss of generality.
Let p1 and p2 denote the prices charged by firm 1 and firm 2 respectively. The
quantities of the two products consumed by the representative consumer are denoted by q1
and q2 respectively. Since the utility function is separable and linear in the numeraire good,
the consumer’s problem can be expressed as the maximization of the (sub) utility function
corresponding to the oligopolistic industry. The consumer selects a pair (q1, q2) to solve:
max u (q1, q2)−
2X
i=1
piqi
where
u (q1, q2) = σq1 + σq2 −
1
2
¡
ωq21 + 2χq1q2 + ωq
2
2
¢
(B.1)
Once again, it is assumed that the goods produced by the two firms are imperfect
substitutes (thus it is assumed that ω > χ > 0).
The role that is played by advertising is that of informing consumers about the
benefits of the advertised product as well as those of the rival product (comparison adver-
tising). This conforms to the definition of informative advertising given above. The nature
of the advertising is such that it is believable and verifiable. An example of such a case is
when a firm advertises that the long term health benefits of its product exceed previously
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held expectations, while that of its rival fall below previously held expectations and backs
up such a claim by citing research conducted by an independent and reputed entity. Fur-
thermore, the benefits are such that they are realized in the long term so that without such
advertising, consumers would not be aware of them.
Consider the case where both firm 1 and 2 engage in such informative advertising.
Firm 1 makes (and backs up) the claim that its product is better than was previously
believed in one dimension (e.g. reducing the level of cholesterol in the long term) while
the product of firm 2 is worse. Similarly, firm 2 makes (and backs up) the claim that its
product is better than was previously believed in another dimension (e.g. it is better for
the heart in the long term) while that of firm 1 is worse.
The advertising level of a firm in such a case is represented by the proportion of
consumers that receive the firm’s message with its claim. Let Φ1 and Φ2 represent the
respective levels of advertising undertaken by firm 1 and firm 2, i.e. the proportion of
consumers that the respective firm targets with its message. This is consistent with the
modeling of informative advertising (for e.g. see Grossman and Shapiro (1984)1)
The eﬀect of firm 1’s message on a consumer who receives it is a revaluation of the
marginal benefit of firm 1’s product (upwards) as well as that of firm 2’s product (down-
wards). Let this be captured by the parameters ε1 and ψ1 denoting that upon receiving the
(believable and verifiable) message of firm 1, the consumer believes the product of firm 1 to
be better in one dimension and that of firm 2 to be worse in that dimension. The eﬀect of
this is for the consumer’s (sub) utility function upon receiving firm 1’s advertising message
1The diﬀerence is that in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) the informative advertising message is only used
to inform the consumers about the existence of the product.
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to be represented by
u (q1, q2) = (σ + ε1) q1 + (σ − ψ1) q2 −
1
2
¡
ωq21 + 2χq1q2 + ωq
2
2
¢
(B.2)
The extent of product diﬀerentiation in the industry will have a bearing on the
magnitude of ψ1, with the magnitude of this parameter decreasing in the extent of product
substitutability (χ). The reason being that if the products are extremely similar to each
other, then it is unlikely that the product of firm 1 is found to be much better in a certain
dimension and firm 2’s product is simultaneously found to be a lot worse in the same
dimension. Thus, the magnitude of ψ1would be decreasing (increasing) in the level of
product substitutability (diﬀerentiation).
It is important to note that the firms’ advertising does not enter the consumer’s
utility function at all. Thus, it can not be characterized as persuasive advertising. The
proportion of consumers that receive firm 1’s message but not firm 2’s and for whom the
(sub) utility function is given by eq.(B.2)is given by Φ1 (1− Φ2) .
Similarly, the eﬀect of firm 2’s message is a revaluation, on the part of the con-
sumer, of the marginal benefit of firm 2’s product (upwards) as well as that of firm 1’s
product (downwards). Let this be captured by the parameters ε2 and ψ2 denoting that
upon receiving the (believable and verifiable) message of firm 2, the consumer believes the
product of firm 2 to be better in the second dimension and that of firm 1 to be worse in
that dimension. The eﬀect of this is for the consumer’s (sub) utility function upon receiving
firm 2’s advertising message to be represented by
u (q1, q2) = (σ − ψ2) q1 + (σ + ε2) q2 −
1
2
¡
ωq21 + 2χq1q2 + ωq
2
2
¢
(B.3)
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where the proportion of such consumers is given by Φ2 (1− Φ1) .
The proportion of consumers that receive both firms’ messages is Φ1Φ2. For these
consumers the (sub) utility function is given by
u (q1, q2) = (σ + ε1 − ψ2) q1 + (σ + ε2 − ψ1) q2 −
1
2
¡
ωq21 + 2χq1q2 + ωq
2
2
¢
(B.4)
Lastly, the proportion of consumers who do not receive either firm’s message is
given by (1− Φ1) (1− Φ2) and the (sub) utility function for these consumers is given by
eq.(B.1).
Assuming ε1 = ε2 = ε and ψ1 = ψ2 = ψ for simplicity, utility maximization by
the four classes of consumers above yields the individual demand functions for the product
of firm 1 and firm 2 respectively for each class of consumers. For those consumers that
receive neither firm’s message (whose proportion is (1− Φ1) (1− Φ2)) and whose utility
function is represented by eq.(B.1) the demand functions for the product of firm 1 and firm
2 respectively are given by
d1 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α− βp1 + δp2
and
d2 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α− βp2 + δp1
For those consumers that receive only firm 1’s message (whose proportion is
Φ1 (1−Φ2)) and whose utility function is represented by eq.(B.2) the demand functions
for the product of firm 1 and firm 2 respectively are given by
d1 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α+ γ − βp1 + δp2
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and
d2 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α− λβp2 + δp1
For those consumers that receive only firm 2’s message (whose proportion is Φ2 (1−Φ1))
and whose utility function is represented by eq.(B.3) the demand functions for the product
of firm 1 and firm 2 respectively are given by
d1 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α− λ− βp1 + δp2
and
d2 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α+ γ − βp2 + δp1
And lastly, for those consumers that receive both firm’s message (whose proportion is
(1− Φ1) (1− Φ2)) and whose utility function is represented by eq.(B.4) the demand func-
tions for the product of firm 1 and firm 2 respectively are given by
d1 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α+ γ − λ− βp1 + δp2
and
d2 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α+ γ − λ− βp2 + δp1
where,
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α =
σ
ω + χ
β =
ω
ω2 − χ2
δ =
χ
ω2 − χ2
γ =
ε
ω + χ
λ =
ψ
ω + χ
Weighting each of these individual demand functions with the corresponding pro-
portion of such consumers one can arrive at the following aggregate demand functions for
firm 1 and firm 2 respectively which are identical to those given by eq.(3.1) and eq(3.2) in
the chapter
D1 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α− βp1 + δp2 + γΦ1 − λΦ2 (B.5)
and
D2 (p1, p2,Φ1,Φ2) = α− βp2 + δp1 + γΦ2 − λΦ1 (B.6)
B.1.2 Product Diﬀerentiation and the Market-Stealing Eﬀect of Adver-
tising
The potential market-stealing eﬀect of (informative) advertising (λ) in the demand
functions above is expected to be increasing in the level of product diﬀerentiation. The
magnitude of the negative eﬀect of firm 1’s advertising on the demand for firm 2’s product
is determined by the extent to which the product of firm 2 is found to be inferior in a
particular dimension than was previously believed (ψ), on the basis of new information
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provided by firm 1’s message. This is bounded by how similar the two products are. If
the two product are very similar then ψ cannot be high in magnitude (for e.g. research
that finds product 1 to be beneficial in a particular dimension is unlikely to find product
2 inferior in that dimension if the two products are almost similar)and correspondingly λ
cannot be high in magnitude either. Thus it is possible even when advertising is informative
that the market-stealing eﬀect of advertising is stronger in diﬀerentiated product industries
as opposed to relatively homogeneous product industries.
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Appendix C 
 
 
Data Appendix 
 
 
C.1 Collusive Products and Four-digit SICS Collusive 
Industries 
 
SICS 
Industry 
Collusive Product Census 
Year 
Code   
2041 Bakery Flour 1957 
2045 Bakery Flour 1957 
2048 Feed and Feed Additives- Citric Acid 1997 
2048 Lysine 1997 
2051 Bread/Bakery Products 1967 
2061 Industrial Cane Sugar 1972 
2061 Refined and Raw Cane Sugar 1972 
2061 Sugar Refining 1972 
2062 Industrial Cane Sugar 1972 
2062 Refined and Raw Cane Sugar 1972 
2062 Sugar Refining 1972 
2063 Sugar Refining 1972 
2075 Salad Oil and Shortening 1957 
2076 Crude Coconut Oil 1977 
2079 Salad Oil and Shortening 1957 
2086 Soft Drink Bottlers 1987 
2091 Whole and Processed Fish/Seafood 1992 
2092 Catfish Products 1987 
2092 Whole and Processed Fish/Seafood 1987 
2096 Snack Foods 1962 
2221 Glass Fiber Industrial Fabrics 1957 
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2221 Packaged Fiberglass Yarn 1992 
2253 Women's Blouses 1947 
2273 Carpet 1987 
2298 Cordage 1987 
2331 Women's Blouses 1947 
2361 Women's Blouses 1947 
2392 Linen Supplies 1962 
2431 Flush Doors 1962 
2431 Residential Flush Doors 1992 
2449 Wirebound Wooden Boxes 1987 
2499 Toilet Seats 1967 
2522 Metal Office Furniture 1962 
2621 Glassine and Greaseproof Paper 1977 
2621 Thermal Fax Paper 1987 
2652 Folding Cartons 1962 
2656 Folding Cartons 1962 
2657 Folding Cartons 1962 
2672 Paper Labels 1967 
2672 Tape Products for Shoe Industry  1967 
 (Pressure Sensitive Tape Products)  
2672 Thermal Fax Paper 1987 
2673 Consumer Bags 1952 
2674 Consumer Bags 1952 
2675 Paper Labels 1967 
2679 Thermal Fax Paper 1992 
2752 Paper Labels 1967 
2754 Paper Labels 1967 
2759 Paper Labels 1967 
2816 Dyes 1972 
2816 Magnetic Iron Oxide 1992 
2819 Aluminum Phosphide 1992 
2819 Artificial Abrasive Grain 1992 
2819 Chemicals for Plastics: Persulfates 1972 
2821 Coatings Resins 1972 
2821 Industrial Nitrocellulose 1987 
2823 Industrial Nitrocellulose 1977 
2824 Polyester Staple 1997 
2833 Antibiotics 1962 
2833 Quinine and Quinidine 1957 
2833 Vitamins (B3 and B4) 1992 
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2834 Antibiotics 1962 
2834 Genric Drugs 1992 
2835 Methyl Glucamine 1992 
2861 Dyes 1972 
2865 Dyes 1972 
2869 Bromine Products (TBBA, DECA and Methyl 
Bromide) 
1992 
2869 Dry Cleaning Fluid: Perchloroethylene 1972 
2869 Feed and Feed Additives- Citric Acid 1992 
2869 Monochloroacetic Acid 1997 
2869 Organic Peroxides 1997 
2869 Rubber Chemicals 1997 
2879 Aluminum Phosphide 1992 
2892 Commercial Explosives 1992 
2899 Rubber Chemicals 1992 
2911 Gasoline 1967 
2911 Gasoline 1962 
2951 Liquid Bituminous Materials 1987 
3052 Hydraulic Hose and Hydraulic Hose Assemblies 1962 
3061 Hydraulic Hose and Hydraulic Hose Assemblies 1962 
3083 High Pressure Laminates 1997 
3084 Plastic Pipe 1957 
3084 Plumbing Supplies (Plastic Pipe Fittings) 1967 
3086 Metal Building Insulation 1992 
3086 Plastic Dinnerware (Disposable) 1992 
3088 Plumbing Fixtures 1962 
3089 New Steel Drums 1992 
3089 Plastic Dinnerware (Disposable) 1992 
3089 Toilet Seats 1967 
3211 Architectural Flat Glass 1997 
3229 Glass Fiber Industrial Fabrics 1957 
3229 Packaged Fiberglass Yarn 1992 
3231 Architectural Flat Glass 1997 
3231 Packaged Fiberglass Yarn 1997 
3261 Plumbing Fixtures 1962 
3272 Asbestos-Cement Pipe and Couplings 1962 
3272 Ready-Mix Concrete 1987 
3272 Ready-Mix Concrete 1967 
3272 Ready-Mix Concrete 1977 
3272 Steel or Concrete Pressure Pipe 1962 
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3273 Ready-Mix Concrete 1977 
3273 Ready-Mix Concrete 1987 
3273 Ready-Mix Concrete 1967 
3291 Artificial Abrasive Grain 1987 
3291 Industrial Diamonds 1987 
3291 Steel Wool Scouring Pads 1992 
3295 Commodity Ferrosilicon Products 1997 
3296 Packaged Fiberglass Yarn 1997 
3312 Electric Weld Steel Tubing 1962 
3312 Passenger Automobile and Light Truck  1982 
 Replacement Wheels  
3312 Reinforcing Steel Bars 1972 
3312 Steel and Alloy Pipe 1982 
3312 Steel Castings 1962 
3312 Steel or Concrete Pressure Pipe 1967 
3313 Commodity Ferrosilicon Products 1992 
3315 Chain Link Fence 1992 
3315 Gabions 1977 
3315 Shopping Carts 1967 
3315 Welded Wire Fabric 1992 
3316 Cable Stayed Bridge Materials 1997 
3316 Electric Weld Steel Tubing 1962 
3316 Reinforcing Steel Bars 1987 
3317 Electric Weld Steel Tubing 1962 
3317 Steel and Alloy Pipe 1983 
3321 Steel and Alloy Pipe 1977 
3325 Steel Castings 1957 
3339 Brazing Alloys 1957 
3339 Silver Mill Products 1947 
3339 Titanium Mill Products 1972 
3341 Brazing Alloys 1957 
3341 Silver Mill Products 1947 
3353 Aluminum Roll Jacketing 1972 
3354 Gas Vent Pipe 1962 
3356 Silver Mill Products 1947 
3356 Titanium Mill Products 1972 
3357 Aluminum Conductor Cable 1957 
3364 Titanium Mill Products 1972 
3369 Titanium Mill Products 1972 
3399 Bronze and Copper Flakes 1987 
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3411 Steel Pails 1992 
3412 New Steel Drums 1992 
3412 Steel Pails 1992 
3429 Architectural Hinges 1987 
3431 Plumbing Fixtures 1962 
3444 Gas Vent Pipe 1962 
3444 Painted Aluminum Products 1997 
3444 Steel or Concrete Pressure Pipe 1962 
3449 Reinforcing Steel Bars 1972 
3452 Internal Wrenchng Bolts (for Aircraft and Missiles) 1957 
3452 Screws 1987 
3452 Self Locking Nuts 1962 
3462 Open Die Steel Forgings 1962 
3463 Titanium Mill Products 1972 
3491 Industrial Valves/ Filter 1992 
3492 Hydraulic Hose and Hydraulic Hose Assemblies 1962 
3494 Carbon Steel Pipe Flanges 1987 
3495 Bed Springs 1957 
3496 Chain Link Fence 1987 
3496 Gabions 1987 
3497 Aluminum Roll Jacketing 1972 
3498 Gas Vent Pipe 1962 
3498 Steel and Alloy Pipe 1983 
3498 Steel or Concrete Pressure Pipe 1962 
3499 Stamped Metal Parts for Lamps and Lighting Fixtures 1987 
3533 Tricone Drill Bits 1992 
3537 Gabions 1987 
3537 Shopping Carts 1967 
3559 Industrial Valves/ Filter 1992 
3561 Oil-Well Pumps 1962 
3568 Drill Jig Bushings 1962 
3569 Electric Weld Steel Tubing 1962 
3589 Industrial Valves/ Filter 1997 
3589 Water Heaters 1962 
3599 Electric Weld Steel Tubing 1962 
3624 Electrical Carbon Products  1997 
 (Current Collectors and Carbon Brushes)  
3624 Graphite Elecrodes 1997 
3624 Isostatic Graphite 1997 
3639 Water Heaters 1962 
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3644 Electric Fuse Products 1967 
3644 Pole/Transmission Line Hardware 1962 
3645 Stamped Metal Parts for Lamps and Lighting Fixtures 1987 
3676 Electrical Equipment Parts  1957 
 (Soft Ferrite Cores, Carbon Resistors, Metal Film Resistors) 
3678 Electrical Equipment Parts  1957 
 (Soft Ferrite Cores, Carbon Resistors, Metal Film Resistors) 
3679 Electric Wiring Devices 1962 
3711 Fleet Market for Automobiles 1972 
3714 Passenger Automobile and Light Truck  1987 
 Replacement Wheels  
3721 Light Airplanes 1962 
3851 Eyeglass (Opthalmic Lenses) 1962 
3952 Educational Art Materials 1987 
3965 Zipper Sliders 1967 
3999 Resale Book Matches 1952 
 
 
 
 
 
C.2 Sample of Industries used in Estimation 
 
Note: NC: Industry classified as non-collusive 
          C: Industry classified as collusive 
 
SICS Industry Name Census Pricing 
Industry 
Code 
 Year Conduct 
2011 FRESH AND FROZEN MEAT FROM ANIMALS  1987 NC 
2013 SAUSAGE AND OTHER PREPARED MEATS 1987 NC 
2015 POULTRY AND EGG PROCESSING 1987 NC 
2021 CREAMERY BUTTER 1987 NC 
2022 CHEESE, NATURAL AND PROCESSED 1987 NC 
2023 DRY, CONDENSED, AND EVAPORATED MILK PRODUCTS 1992 NC 
2024 ICE CREAM AND FROZEN DESSERTS 1997 NC 
2026 FLUID MILK 1997 NC 
2032 CANNED SPECIALTIES 1987 NC 
2033 CANNED FRUITS AND VEGETABLES 1992 NC 
2034 DRIED AND DEHYDRATED FRUITS, VEGETABLES, AND 
SOUPS 
1987 NC 
2035 PICKLES, SAUCES, AND SALAD DRESSINGS 1992 NC 
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2037 FROZEN FRUITS AND VEGETABLES 1992 NC 
2038 FROZEN SPECIALTIES, N.E.C. 1987 NC 
2043 CEREAL BREAKFAST FOODS 1987 NC 
2044 RICE MILLING 1987 NC 
2046 WET CORN MILLING 1987 NC 
2047 DOG AND CAT FOOD 1997 NC 
2048 PREPARED FEEDS, N.E.C. 1997 C 
2052 COOKIES AND CRACKERS 1987 NC 
2053 FROZEN BAKERY PRODUCTS 1997 NC 
2066 CHOCOLATE AND COCOA PRODUCTS 1992 NC 
2068 NUTS AND SEEDS 1992 NC 
2074 COTTONSEED OIL MILLS 1987 NC 
2077 ANIMAL AND MARINE FATS AND OILS 1992 NC 
2082 MALT BEVERAGES 1987 NC 
2083 MALT 1997 NC 
2084 WINES, BRANDY, AND BRANDY SPIRITS 1997 NC 
2085 DISTILLED AND BLENDED LIQUORS 1992 NC 
2086 BOTTLED AND CANNED SOFT DRINKS 1987 C 
2087 FLAVORING EXTRACTS AND SYRUPS, N.E.C. 1987 NC 
2091 CANNED AND CURED FISH AND OTHER SEAFOODS 1992 C 
2092 FRESH OR FROZEN PREPARED FISH AND OTHER SEAFOOD 1987 C 
2095 ROASTED COFFEE 1992 NC 
2097 MANUFACTURED ICE 1997 NC 
2131 CHEWING AND SMOKING TOBACCO 1987 NC 
2141 TOBACCO STEMMING AND REDRYING 1992 NC 
2211 BROADWOVEN FABRIC MILLS, COTTON 1987 NC 
2221 BROADWOVEN FABRIC MILLS, MANMADE FIBER AND SILK 1992 C 
2231 BROADWOVEN FABRIC MILLS, WOOL 1987 NC 
2241 NARROW FABRIC MILLS 1987 NC 
2251 WOMEN'S HOSIERY, EXCEPT SOCKS 1992 NC 
2252 HOSIERY, N.E.C. 1992 NC 
2254 KNIT UNDERWEAR MILLS 1987 NC 
2257 WEFT KNIT FABRIC MILLS 1992 NC 
2258 WARP KNIT FABRIC MILLS AND LACE GOODS 1992 NC 
2259 KNITTING MILLS, N.E.C. 1987 NC 
2261 FINISHING PLANTS, COTTON 1987 NC 
2262 FINISHING PLANTS, MANMADE FIBER AND SILK 1992 NC 
2269 FINISHING PLANTS, N.E.C. 1987 NC 
2273 CARPETS AND RUGS 1987 C 
2281 YARN SPINNING MILLS 1987 NC 
2282 YARN THROWING AND WINDING MILLS 1992 NC 
2284 THREAD MILLS 1992 NC 
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2295 COATED FABRICS, NOT RUBBERIZED 1992 NC 
2296 TIRE CORD AND TIRE CORD FABRICS 1992 NC 
2297 NONWOVEN FABRICS 1992 NC 
2298 CORDAGE AND TWINE 1987 C 
2299 TEXTILE GOODS, N.E.C. 1992 NC 
2311 MEN'S AND BOYS' SUITS AND COATS 1987 NC 
2321 MEN'S AND BOYS' SHIRTS 1987 NC 
2322 MEN'S AND BOYS' UNDERWEAR AND NIGHTWEAR 1987 NC 
2323 MEN'S AND BOYS' NECKWEAR 1997 NC 
2325 MEN'S AND BOYS' TROUSERS AND SLACKS 1987 NC 
2326 MEN'S AND BOYS' WORK CLOTHING 1987 NC 
2329 MEN'S AND BOYS' CLOTHING, N.E.C. 1987 NC 
2335 WOMEN'S, MISSES', AND JUNIORS' DRESSES 1987 NC 
2339 WOMEN'S, MISSES', AND JUNIORS' OUTERWEAR, N.E.C. 1987 NC 
2341 WOMEN'S, CHILDREN'S, AND INFANTS' UW & NW 1992 NC 
2342 BRASSIERES, GIRDLES, AND ALLIED GARMENTS 1987 NC 
2353 HATS, CAPS, AND MILLINERY 1987 NC 
2369 GIRLS', CHILDREN'S, AND INFANTS' OTHER OUTERWEAR 1992 NC 
2371 FUR GOODS 1987 NC 
2381 DRESS AND WORK GLOVES AND MITTENS 1992 NC 
2384 ROBES AND DRESSING GOWNS 1992 NC 
2385 WATERPROOF OUTERWEAR 1987 NC 
2386 LEATHER AND SHEEP-LINED CLOTHING 1992 NC 
2393 TEXTILE BAGS 1987 NC 
2394 CANVAS AND RELATED PRODUCTS 1997 NC 
2395 PLEATING AND STITCHING 1987 NC 
2396 AUTOMOTIVE TRIMMINGS ETC. 1992 NC 
2397 SCHIFFLI MACHINE EMBROIDERIES 1992 NC 
2399 FABRICATED TEXTILE PRODUCTS, N.E.C. 1987 NC 
2411 LOGGING 1987 NC 
2421 SAWMILLS AND PLANING MILLS, GENERAL 1987 NC 
2426 HARDWOOD DIMENSION AND FLOORING MILLS 1992 NC 
2431 MILLWORK 1992 C 
2434 WOOD KITCHEN CABINETS 1992 NC 
2435 HARDWOOD VENEER AND PLYWOOD 1992 NC 
2436 SOFTWOOD VENEER AND PLYWOOD 1997 NC 
2439 STRUCTURAL WOOD MEMBERS, N.E.C. 1992 NC 
2441 NAILED WOOD BOXES AND SHOOK 1987 NC 
2449 WOOD CONTAINERS, N.E.C. 1987 C 
2451 MOBILE HOMES 1992 NC 
2452 PREFABRICATED WOOD BUILDINGS 1987 C 
2491 WOOD PRESERVING 1987 NC 
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2493 RECONSTITUTED WOOD PRODUCTS 1992 C 
2512 UPHOLSTERED HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE 1992 NC 
2514 METAL HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE 1987 NC 
2519 HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE, N.E.C. 1992 NC 
2521 WOOD OFFICE FURNITURE 1992 NC 
2531 PUBLIC BUILDING AND RELATED FURNITURE 1987 NC 
2541 WOOD PARTITIONS AND FIXTURES 1992 NC 
2542 PARTITIONS AND FIXTURES, EXCEPT WOOD 1992 NC 
2591 DRAPERY HARDWARE AND BLINDS AND SHADES 1997 NC 
2611 PULP MILLS 1992 NC 
2621 PAPER MILLS 1987 C 
2631 PAPERBOARD MILLS 1992 NC 
2672 PAPER COATING AND LAMINATING, N.E.C. 1987 C 
2679 CONVERTED PAPER PRODUCTS, N.E.C. 1992 C 
2761 MANIFOLD BUSINESS FORMS 1987 NC 
2771 GREETING CARDS 1992 NC 
2782 BLANKBOOKS AND LOOSELEAF BINDERS 1992 NC 
2791 TYPESETTING 1987 NC 
2796 PLATEMAKING SERVICES 1987 NC 
2812 ALKALIES AND CHLORINE 1992 NC 
2813 INDUSTRIAL GASES 1992 NC 
2816 INORGANIC PIGMENTS 1992 C 
2819 INDUSTRIAL INORGANIC CHEMICALS, N.E.C. 1992 C 
2824 MANMADE ORGANIC FIBERS, NONCELLULOSIC 1997 C 
2833 MEDICINALS AND BOTANICALS 1992 C 
2834 PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATIONS 1992 C 
2835 DIAGNOSTIC SUBSTANCES 1992 C 
2836 BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS, EXCEPT DIAGNOSTIC 1997 NC 
2841 SOAP AND OTHER DETERGENTS 1992 NC 
2842 POLISHES AND SANITATION GOODS 1992 NC 
2843 SURFACTANTS, FINISHING AGENTS, AND ASSISTANTS 1987 NC 
2844 TOILET PREPARATIONS 1987 NC 
2851 PAINTS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 1992 NC 
2869 INDUSTRIAL ORGANIC CHEMICALS, N.E.C. 1992 C 
2873 NITROGENOUS FERTILIZERS 1992 C 
2874 PHOSPHATIC FERTILIZERS 1997 NC 
2875 FERTILIZERS, MIXING ONLY 1987 NC 
2879 AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS, N.E.C. 1992 C 
2892 EXPLOSIVES 1992 C 
2895 CARBON BLACK 1987 NC 
2899 CHEMICAL PREPARATIONS, N.E.C. 1992 C 
2951 ASPHALT PAVING MIXTURES AND BLOCKS 1987 C 
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2952 ASPHALT FELTS AND COATINGS 1992 NC 
2992 LUBRICATING OILS AND GREASES 1987 NC 
3011 TIRES AND INNER TUBES 1992 NC 
3021 RUBBER AND PLASTICS FOOTWEAR 1987 NC 
3081 UNSUPPORTED PLASTICS FILM AND SHEET 1992 NC 
3082 UNSUPPORTED PLASTICS PROFILE SHAPES 1997 NC 
3083 LAMINATED PLASTICS PLATE AND SHEET 1997 C 
3086 PLASTICS FOAM PRODUCTS 1992 C 
3087 CUSTOM COMPOUND PURCHASED RESINS 1992 NC 
3089 PLASTICS PRODUCTS, N.E.C. 1992 C 
3111 LEATHER TANNING AND FINISHING 1987 NC 
3131 BOOT AND SHOE CUT STOCK AND FINDINGS 1987 NC 
3142 HOUSE SLIPPERS 1992 NC 
3143 MEN'S FOOTWEAR, EXCEPT ATHLETIC 1992 NC 
3144 WOMEN'S FOOTWEAR, EXCEPT ATHLETIC 1992 NC 
3149 FOOTWEAR, EXCEPT RUBBER, N.E.C. 1987 NC 
3151 LEATHER GLOVES AND MITTENS 1992 NC 
3161 LUGGAGE 1997 NC 
3171 WOMEN'S AND CHILDREN'S HANDBAGS AND PURSES 1987 NC 
3172 PERSONAL LEATHER GOODS, N.E.C. 1997 NC 
3199 LEATHER GOODS, N.E.C. 1987 NC 
3211 FLAT GLASS 1997 C 
3221 GLASS CONTAINERS 1997 NC 
3241 CEMENT, HYDRAULIC 1992 NC 
3251 BRICK AND STRUCTURAL CLAY TILE 1992 NC 
3253 CERAMIC WALL AND FLOOR TILE 1997 NC 
3255 CLAY REFRACTORIES 1987 NC 
3259 STRUCTURAL CLAY PRODUCTS, N.E.C. 1987 NC 
3262 VITREOUS CHINA TABLE AND KITCHENWARE 1992 NC 
3263 SEMIVITREOUS TABLE AND KITCHENWARE 1987 NC 
3264 PORCELAIN ELECTRICAL SUPPLIES 1992 NC 
3269 POTTERY PRODUCTS, N.E.C. 1992 NC 
3271 CONCRETE BLOCK AND BRICK 1987 NC 
3272 CONCRETE PRODUCTS, N.E.C. 1987 C 
3273 READY-MIXED CONCRETE 1987 C 
3274 LIME 1992 NC 
3275 GYPSUM PRODUCTS 1987 NC 
3281 CUT STONE AND STONE PRODUCTS 1992 NC 
3291 ABRASIVE PRODUCTS 1987 C 
3292 ASBESTOS PRODUCTS 1992 NC 
3295 MINERALS, GROUND OR TREATED 1997 C 
3296 MINERAL WOOL 1997 C 
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3297 NONCLAY REFRACTORIES 1997 NC 
3299 NONMETALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS, N.E.C. 1987 NC 
3312 BLAST FURNACES AND STEEL MILLS 1997 C 
3313 ELECTROMETALLURGICAL PRODUCTS 1992 C 
3315 STEEL WIRE AND RELATED PRODUCTS 1992 C 
3316 COLD-FINISHING OF STEEL SHAPES 1987 C 
3322 MALLEABLE IRON FOUNDRIES 1987 NC 
3324 STEEL INVESTMENT FOUNDRIES 1992 NC 
3331 PRIMARY COPPER 1992 NC 
3334 PRIMARY ALUMINUM 1992 NC 
3351 COPPER ROLLING AND DRAWING 1987 NC 
3355 ALUMINUM ROLLING AND DRAWING, N.E.C. 1987 NC 
3366 COPPER FOUNDRIES 1997 NC 
3399 PRIMARY METAL PRODUCTS, N.E.C. 1987 C 
3411 METAL CANS 1992 C 
3412 METAL BARRELS, DRUMS, AND PAILS 1992 C 
3421 CUTLERY 1987 NC 
3423 HAND AND EDGE TOOLS, N.E.C. 1992 NC 
3425 SAW BLADES AND HANDSAWS 1997 NC 
3429 HARDWARE, N.E.C. 1987 C 
3433 HEATING EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT ELECTRIC 1987 NC 
3441 FABRICATED STRUCTURAL METAL 1997 C 
3442 METAL DOORS, SASH, AND TRIM 1992 NC 
3446 ARCHITECTURAL METAL WORK 1987 NC 
3448 PREFABRICATED METAL BUILDINGS 1997 NC 
3452 BOLTS, NUTS, RIVETS, AND WASHERS 1987 C 
3465 AUTOMOTIVE STAMPINGS 1987 NC 
3466 CROWNS AND CLOSURES 1987 NC 
3469 METAL STAMPINGS, N.E.C. 1992 NC 
3479 METAL COATING AND ALLIED SERVICES 1987 NC 
3483 AMMUNITION, EXCEPT FOR SMALL ARMS, N.E.C. 1997 NC 
3484 SMALL ARMS 1992 NC 
3489 ORDNANCE AND ACCESSORIES, N.E.C. 1997 NC 
3491 INDUSTRIAL VALVES 1992 C 
3494 VALVES AND PIPE FITTINGS, N.E.C. 1987 C 
3496 MISCELLANEOUS FABRICATED WIRE PRODUCTS 1987 C 
3499 FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS, N.E.C. 1987 C 
3519 INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINES, N.E.C. 1987 NC 
3523 FARM MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 1992 NC 
3524 LAWN AND GARDEN EQUIPMENT 1992 NC 
3531 CONSTRUCTION MACHINERY 1992 NC 
3533 OIL AND GAS FIELD MACHINERY 1992 C 
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3534 ELEVATORS AND MOVING STAIRWAYS 1992 NC 
3535 CONVEYORS AND CONVEYING EQUIPMENT 1992 NC 
3536 HOISTS, CRANES, AND MONORAILS 1992 NC 
3537 INDUSTRIAL TRUCKS AND TRACTORS 1987 C 
3541 MACHINE TOOLS, METAL CUTTING TYPES 1992 NC 
3542 MACHINE TOOLS, METAL FORMING TYPES 1992 NC 
3543 INDUSTRIAL PATTERNS 1987 NC 
3544 SPECIAL DIES, TOOLS, JIGS, AND FIXTURES 1992 NC 
3546 POWER-DRIVEN HANDTOOLS 1997 NC 
3547 ROLLING MILL MACHINERY 1987 NC 
3548 WELDING APPARATUS 1992 NC 
3549 METALWORKING MACHINERY, N.E.C. 1997 NC 
3552 TEXTILE MACHINERY 1992 NC 
3553 WOODWORKING MACHINERY 1997 NC 
3554 PAPER INDUSTRIES MACHINERY 1992 NC 
3555 PRINTING TRADES MACHINERY 1992 NC 
3559 SPECIAL INDUSTRY MACHINERY, N.E.C. 1992 C 
3562 BALL AND ROLLER BEARINGS 1992 NC 
3563 AIR AND GAS COMPRESSORS 1992 NC 
3564 BLOWERS AND FANS 1992 NC 
3565 PACKAGING MACHINERY 1997 NC 
3566 SPEED CHANGERS, DRIVES, AND GEARS 1987 NC 
3567 INDUSTRIAL FURNACES AND OVENS 1997 NC 
3577 COMPUTER PERIPHERAL EQUIPMENT, N.E.C. 1987 NC 
3578 CALCULATING AND ACCOUNTING EQUIPMENT 1992 NC 
3579 OFFICE MACHINES, N.E.C. 1992 NC 
3581 AUTOMATIC MERCHANDISING MACHINES 1987 NC 
3582 COMMERCIAL LAUNDRY EQUIPMENT 1987 NC 
3585 REFRIGERATION AND HEATING EQUIPMENT 1992 NC 
3586 MEASURING AND DISPENSING PUMPS 1992 NC 
3589 SERVICE INDUSTRY MACHINERY, N.E.C. 1997 C 
3592 CARBURETORS, PISTONS, RINGS, AND VALVES 1992 NC 
3593 FLUID POWER CYLINDERS AND ACTUATORS 1992 NC 
3594 HYDROSTATIC TRANSMISSION COMPONENTS 1987 NC 
3612 TRANSFORMERS, EXCEPT ELECTRONIC 1987 NC 
3621 MOTORS AND GENERATORS 1987 NC 
3624 CARBON AND GRAPHITE PRODUCTS 1997 C 
3625 RELAYS AND INDUSTRIAL CONTROLS 1997 NC 
3629 ELECTRICAL INDUSTRIAL APPARATUS, N.E.C. 1987 NC 
3631 HOUSEHOLD COOKING EQUIPMENT 1997 NC 
3632 HOUSEHOLD REFRIGERATORS AND FREEZERS 1987 NC 
3633 HOUSEHOLD LAUNDRY EQUIPMENT 1992 NC 
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3634 ELECTRIC HOUSEWARES AND FANS 1992 NC 
3635 HOUSEHOLD VACUUM CLEANERS 1992 NC 
3643 CURRENT-CARRYING WIRING DEVICES 1987 C 
3644 NONCURRENT-CARRYING WIRING DEVICES 1987 C 
3645 RESIDENTIAL LIGHTING FIXTURES 1987 C 
3646  ELECTRIC LIGHTING FIXTURES 1987 C 
3651 RADIO RECEIVERS, TELEVISION SETS, PHONOGRAPHS 1997 NC 
3652 PRERECORDED RECORDS AND TAPES 1987 NC 
3663 RADIO AND TV COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 1992 NC 
3669 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, N.E.C. 1997 NC 
3672 PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARDS 1987 NC 
3674 SEMICONDUCTORS AND RELATED DEVICES 1997 C 
3677 COILS, TRANSFORMERS, REACTORS,CHOKES FOR ELEC. 
CIRC. 
1992 NC 
3691 STORAGE BATTERIES 1987 NC 
3692 PRIMARY BATTERIES, DRY AND WET 1987 NC 
3694 ENGINE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 1992 NC 
3699 ELECTRICAL MACHINERY, EQUIPMENT, AND SUPPLIES, 
N.E.C. 
1987 NC 
3713 TRUCK AND BUS BODIES 1987 NC 
3714 MOTOR VEHICLE PARTS AND ACCESSORIES 1987 C 
3715 TRUCK TRAILERS 1992 NC 
3724 AIRCRAFT ENGINES AND ENGINE PARTS 1987 NC 
3728 AIRCRAFT PARTS AND AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT, N.E.C. 1992 NC 
3732 BOAT BUILDING AND REPAIRING 1987 NC 
3761 GUIDED MISSILES AND SPACE VEHICLES 1987 NC 
3764 SPACE PROPULSION UNITS AND PARTS 1997 NC 
3769 SPACE VEHICLE EQUIPMENT, N.E.C. 1987 NC 
3792 TRAVEL TRAILERS AND CAMPERS 1987 NC 
3795 TANKS AND TANK COMPONENTS 1987 NC 
3799 TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT, N.E.C. 1987 NC 
3812 AERONAUTICAL AND NAUTICAL SYSTEMS AND 
EQUIPMENT 
1992 NC 
3821 LABORATORY APPARATUS AND FURNITURE 1997 NC 
3822 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS 1987 NC 
3823 PROCESS CONTROL INSTRUMENTS 1987 NC 
3824 FLUID METERS AND COUNTING DEVICES 1992 NC 
3825 INSTRUMENTS TO MEASURE ELECTRICITY 1992 NC 
3826 ANALYTICAL INSTRUMENTS 1987 NC 
3827 OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS AND LENSES 1987 NC 
3829 MEASURING AND CONTROLLING DEVICES, N.E.C. 1992 NC 
3841 SURGICAL AND MEDICAL INSTRUMENTS 1987 NC 
 133
3842 SURGICAL APPLIANCES AND SUPPLIES 1992 NC 
3843 DENTAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES 1992 NC 
3844 X-RAY APPARATUS AND TUBES 1992 NC 
3845 ELECTROMEDICAL EQUIPMENT 1992 NC 
3861 PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES 1992 NC 
3873 WATCHES, CLOCKS, WATCHCASES, AND PARTS 1987 NC 
3911 JEWELRY, PRECIOUS METAL 1987 NC 
3914 SILVERWARE AND PLATED WARE 1987 NC 
3915 JEWELERS' MATERIALS AND LAPIDARY WORK 1992 NC 
3931 MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS 1987 NC 
3942 DOLLS AND STUFFED TOYS 1987 NC 
3944 GAMES, TOYS, AND CHILDREN'S VEHICLES 1992 NC 
3949 SPORTING AND ATHLETIC GOODS, N.E.C. 1992 NC 
3951 PENS AND MECHANICAL PENCILS 1987 NC 
3952 LEAD PENCILS AND ART GOODS 1987 C 
3955 CARBON PAPER AND INKED RIBBONS 1992 NC 
3961 COSTUME JEWELRY 1992 NC 
3991 BROOMS AND BRUSHES 1992 NC 
3993 SIGNS AND ADVERTISING SPECIALTIES 1992 NC 
3996 HARD SURFACE FLOOR COVERINGS, N.E.C. 1992 NC 
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